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The focus of this dissertation is on the operation of electric power systems, specifically 
on wholesale electricity markets and the potential for exercising market power in wholesale 
markets for electricity. Restructuring of the electric utility industry has encouraged Independent 
Power Producers (IPPs) to enter the industry and sell power in the wholesale electricity markets. 
However, as the United States continues the transition to restructured electricity markets, there 
are concerns about the market power that producers may exert. This dissertation is composed of 
three essays exploring these topics using dynamic optimization methods and empirical analysis.  
The first essay uses a framework to measure production costs and the component of price 
that is above marginal cost. I incorporate the start-up costs of generators. Using data from January 
2016 to December 2018, I find evidence that market power was exercised, particularly in months 
having unseasonably cold temperatures and fuel price spikes as well as during the winter peak 
season. The results also suggest that the degree of market power increases during the peak hours 
of the day.  
The second essay utilizes a dynamic optimization model to illustrate how a low-
temperature geothermal power plant can be flexibly dispatched to offer multiple different services 
in addition to base-load power to a utility customer. The utility industry still thinks of geothermal 
as a base-load resource, but I show that low temperature resource geothermal power plants offer 
more flexibility than other renewable energy technologies and thus can be operated as a variable 
energy resource to accommodate intermittent resources and alleviate transmission congestion.  
The third essay examines the interaction of policies, markets, and technologies that 
creates the modern electrical system. Integrating large amounts of electricity generated by 
variable renewable resources, such as from wind and solar, into electricity systems may require 
energy storage technologies to synchronize electricity production with electricity demand. 
Electricity markets compensate the performance of these energy storage technologies for the 
services they provide, and these markets are often operated by regional Independent System 
Operators (ISOs) that specify the market rules for this compensation. To examine how different 
ISO rules can affect the operation and profitability an energy storage technology, I develop a 
dynamic programming model of pumped hydroelectric storage (PHES) facility operation under 
the market rules from the Midcontinent ISO and ISO-New England. I show how differences in 
rules between these ISOs produce different operational strategies and profits and may not 
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The electricity industry has undergone significant changes since the mid-1990s in the 
transition from investor-owned utilities, where generation, transmission, and distribution are 
bundled, to a structure where generation, transmission, and distribution are unbundled. This 
transition was enabled by changes in federal regulation, starting with the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) Order 888, which allowed for the creation of wholesale 
electricity markets and required non-discriminatory access to transmission. Subsequently, FERC 
Order 2000 was issued, which provided the regulatory framework for the creation of Regional 
Transmission Operators (RTOs). RTOs administer the wholesale electricity markets, operate the 
electric power grid, and coordinate long-term planning around the adequacy of resources. The 
transition from vertically integrated investor-owned utilities to a structure where generation, 
transmission, and distribution are unbundled has not occurred evenly across the United States. In 
part, this is due to significant opposition to restructuring since the 2000-01 energy crisis in 
California. According to the Energy Information Association (EIA) (n.d.), there are six RTOs and 
one Independent Service Operator (ISO): 
 PJM Interconnection (PJM) 
 Midcontinent ISO (MISO) 
 California ISO (CAISO) 
 Southwest Power Pool (SPP) 
 New York ISO (NYISO) 
 New England ISO (ISO-NE) 
 Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) 
These seven RTOs/ISOs serve approximately two-thirds of consumers in the United States (Boyd 
and Hanis, 2020).  
The goal of restructuring the electric utility industry has been to improve the efficiency of 
the electric utility industry. Many positives have been associated with restructuring of the electric 
utility industry, such as greater opportunities for IPPs and greater penetration of renewable 
energies. However, Wolak (2000) makes the point that the transition to competitive wholesale 
electricity markets has brought with it new policy challenges. Since the energy crisis in 
California, the issue receiving the most attention is the opportunity to exercise market power. 
Chapter 1 of this dissertation considers the exercise of market power in the PJM region. Market 
power is defined as the ability of a power producer to manipulate the market clearing price of 
electricity above the competitive price level. Under traditional cost-of-service regulation, 
regulators determine prices and thus utilities are unable to exercise market power through the 
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manipulation of prices. RTOs and ISOs have adopted different market rules to mitigate the 
potential for exercising market power on the part of producers. Yet, there may still be 
opportunities to extract monopoly rents. In chapter 1, I investigate the exercise of market power 
in the PJM region, which offers an interesting comparison to most studies of market power which 
focus on the CAISO territory, since CAISO and PJM have different market structures and market 
rules.  
The restructuring of the electricity industry has led to large growth in the share of 
electricity generated by independent power producers (IPPs) with more than 40 percent of U.S. 
power production being supplied by IPPs as of 2017 according to Gifford et al. (2017). However, 
they note that independent power producers have had financial struggles because their revenues 
generally do not cover fixed and variable production costs. Nevertheless, the movement to greater 
competition in the generation market has opened many opportunities for IPPs. There is also a 
greater imperative for IPPs to develop operating strategies for mitigating risk and increasing the 
probability of being profitable. Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation consider the operating 
strategies and economic viability of different energy storage systems. Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation uses a dynamic programming model to investigate an operating strategy from the 
perspective of a single low-temperature geothermal power plant seeking to maximize profit from 
the sale of electricity. Conditions are discussed under which the low-temperature geothermal 
power plant with chilled-water cooling system is economically viable. Chapter 3 of this 
dissertation considers the economic viability of pumped hydroelectric storage (PHES). In this 
chapter I develop a dynamic programming model of pumped hydroelectric storage (PHES) 
facility operation under the market rules from the Midcontinent ISO and ISO-New England. I 
show how differences in rules between these ISOs produce different operational strategies and 
profits, which in turn impact the economic viability of energy storage projects. The results 
highlight how policies and institutions designed to promote competition have major implications 
for the development of the electric utility industry and the opportunities that exist for different 
players to profit from increased competition.  
1.1 Dissertation Objectives 
In Chapter 1, I investigate concerns about the exercise of market power. Competitive 
benchmark models are constructed with and without the incorporation of start-up costs. The 
competitive benchmark price is determined by the intersection of residual demand with the 
aggregate marginal curve. I infer the exercise of market based on the difference between the 
system-wide energy price and the competitive benchmark price.  
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Chapter 2 describes a low-temperature geothermal plant with a chilled-water cooling 
system. Using a dynamic programming model, I analyze the relationship between the ambient 
temperature and the existence of arbitrage opportunities in such a system.  
In Chapter 3, I use a dynamic programming model to investigate the profit-maximizing 
behavior of a PHES facility and estimate revenue streams from selling both electricity and grid 
reliability services into different competitive wholesale electricity markets with different 
compensation mechanisms. The solution to the model determines optimal market bidding 
strategies for electricity and reliability services that operate under both the MISO and ISO-NE 
market rules. By comparing the value of PHES systems and the impacts of these different rules 
on revenue streams, a better understanding of the value of different policies and how they 




2. Chapter 1 - Measuring Market Power in the PJM Region 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The transition to deregulated wholesale electricity markets in the late 1990s and the 
2000-2001 California electricity crisis fueled concerns about the potential for the exercise of 
market power by market participants. Across the United States, restructuring of the electricity 
industry has taken on different forms with some regions being further along in making market-
based reforms. Many experts have noted that restructuring is based on the concept that market-
based reforms would result in greater efficiency from fostering competition in the marketplace 
that would ultimately result in lower costs to retail customers (Borenstein and Bushnell, 2015). 
However, there have been negative experiences with restructuring, most notably the 2000-2001 
California electricity crisis in which the state experienced rolling blackouts as a result of market 
manipulation in which producers withheld capacity during certain times to increase electricity 
prices in the wholesale market. The California electricity crisis, in particular, slowed and/or 
stalled efforts to implement market-based reforms in the industry in some parts of the United 
States. The electricity crisis in California and negative experiences elsewhere increased concern 
and awareness about possibilities for electricity suppliers to exercise market power in the 
wholesale electricity markets by acting strategically, such as by withholding capacity, in order to 
manipulate electricity prices.  
Several studies have been conducted on the California electricity market showing 
potential for the exercise of market power by producers (Harvey and Hogan, 2001; Borenstein, 
Bushnell, and Wolak, 2002; Joskow and Kahn, 2002). California has experienced many periods 
of high electricity prices and these studies show that prices have exceeded the competitive 
benchmark price. Concerns about the abuse of market power leading to excessively high prices 
prompted development of market power mitigation processes. Market mitigation generally falls 
into one of two distinct approaches: structural approaches that analyze whether the market 
structure is likely to lead to market power abuses, and direct approaches that assess whether 
supply bids exceed a competitive benchmark. One of the most well-known structural tests is the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) test. Most of the literature before and shortly after the 2000-
2001 California electricity crisis makes the point that the HHI test, which is a measure of market 
power based on market share, is not ideal for measuring the possibility for exercising market 
power in wholesale electricity markets (see for example Borenstein and Bushnell 2000). 
Blumsack (2002) called for the use of the pivotal supplier concept in assessing the potential for 
exercising market power. A power plant is generally considered to be a pivotal supplier if its 
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generation capacity is required for satisfying the demand for electricity. Blumsack argues that 
there is greater potential for pivotal suppliers to manipulate market prices since they are required 
to be dispatched to satisfy demand for electricity. The pivotal supplier concept has been adopted 
by the RTOs, whose purpose it is to administer the wholesale electricity markets and operate the 
transmission grid, in the tests they use to monitor the electricity markets for the potential 
manipulation of electricity prices. Pivotal supplier tests, which are tests of market structure, are 
generally favored by RTOs over direct approaches that seek to compare market prices to a cost-
based offer because costs are not observable and cannot always be determined with sufficient 
accuracy for purposes of setting thresholds to determine excessive pricing. Since the competitive 
benchmark price is not observable and cannot always be measured directly, the RTOs have 
increasingly looked to the use of pivotal supplier tests for assessing the possibility of market 
power abuses.  
This paper analyzes the exercise of market power in the PJM electricity market because 
this region offers an interesting comparison to some of the prior research focusing on the exercise 
of market power in California’s electricity market. First, PJM was established in 1997 and its 
market mitigation rules, which utilize the pivotal supplier test, have had time to mature. 
Therefore, the results in this paper could support a market power mitigation approach based on 
the pivotal supplier concept. If the prevailing system-wide electricity prices are at the competitive 
level, this could be interpreted as demonstrating the effectiveness of the  pivotal supplier 
structural test for market monitoring and mitigation as used in PJM. Second, PJM differs 
significantly from California in terms of its generation and transmission assets. Blumsack (2002) 
points out that the PJM power system network is more spatially dense than systems in other 
regions of the United States. Additionally, it has many interconnections with other systems that 
also enhance its capability to import/export power. The PJM market is in a region where the 
amount of generation and transmission assets and configuration of the electricity grid should 
favor competitive market prices. Given these favorable conditions, we can observe whether 
system-wide electricity prices are competitive. 
Two models of competitive benchmark prices are utilized to evaluate the degree of 
market power in the PJM region. The first model is based on the competitive benchmark model 
developed in Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak (2002). The second model represents an extension 
to the first model because it takes into account the start-up costs of fossil fuel power plants. The 
results from the competitive benchmark price models show that differences in model construction 
can lead to differences in conclusions about the competitive effects of restructuring the electricity 
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industry. Taking start-up costs into account tends to result in the measurement of competitive 
benchmark prices that are closer to the mean level of system-wide electricity prices.  
This paper is organized into the following sections. Section 2 provides background 
information to support the construction of the competitive benchmark models. Section 3 describes 
the assumptions about the operation of power plants and prices within the PJM region. This 
section also describes some features of the model and the mechanics of the marginal cost 
calculation. Section 4 discusses electricity prices and demand for power in the PJM Region. 
Section 5 describes the methodology for estimating the marginal cost of generation. Section 6 




Borenstein and Bushnell (2015) provide a comprehensive and up-to-date account of the 
history of restructuring in the electricity industry in the United States. Beginning in the 1990s, 
there was a transition from a system of vertically integrated monopolies in which the utilities 
owned and operated the transmission grid, power plants, and distribution network to the current 
structure in which these assets are unbundled. Currently, the retail level of the electric utility 
industry is still subject to cost-of-service regulation in most areas of the United States. However, 
operational control of the transmission grid has been removed from utilities and given to RTOs. 
There are currently seven RTOs in the United States charged with operating the transmission grid 
and administering the wholesale electricity market. A core function of the RTOs is to ensure that 
all power suppliers have free access to the transmission grid. Restructuring of the electricity 
industry has thus led to a proliferation of Independent Power Producers (IPPs) that either receive 
a market-based price for the power they supply in the wholesale markets or enter into bilateral 
contracts with buyers for the sale of power.  
Several papers were published after the 2000-2001 California electricity crisis analyzing 
the degree of market power in wholesale electricity markets (Borenstein, 2000; Harvey and 
Hogan, 2001; Joskow and Kahn, 2002; Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak, 2002; Wolak, 2003; 
Borenstein, 2005; Borenstein and Holland, 2005; Bushnell, Mansur, and Saravia, 2008; Wolak, 
2010). The essential feature of the models in these papers is an aggregate marginal cost function 
constructed from the marginal cost of each power plant. Marginal cost is determined by 
incorporating detailed information at the power plant level on the efficiency of each power plant, 
fuel costs, and variable operations and maintenance costs. The competitive benchmark price is 
determined as the marginal cost of production where the aggregate marginal cost curve intersects 
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with level of electricity consumed during a particular time period. These studies vary in terms of 
the incorporation of additional variables and components of marginal cost, including scheduled 
and unplanned outages, net imports of power, and technical characteristics of the transmission 
grid and/or generation power plants. 
In these models, power plants are assumed to produce power at maximum capacity if 
their position along the aggregate marginal cost curve falls on or below the point of intersection 
between the aggregate marginal cost curve and residual demand Generators are assumed to shut 
down operations if their position along the aggregate marginal cost curve falls above the point of 
intersection. Some authors claim that these models produce results that underestimate the 
competitive benchmark price and overestimate market power abuses because they ignore start-up 
costs. It should be noted, however, that this simplifying assumption may have done a reasonably 
good job of approximating the power plant costs prior to the introduction of high levels of 
renewable energy sources. With higher levels of renewable generation, more fossil fuel plants are 
operated as load-following and have more frequent start-ups. Therefore, it becomes more 
important to account for start-up costs in the estimation of a competitive benchmark price. 
Staffell and Green (2016) present a simple model to account for start-up costs. First, they use a 
heuristic method for estimating the number of start-ups per year. Fossil fuel plants are assumed to 
be in one of only two possible states, either on or off. Then the number of start-ups per year for 
each power plant is estimated based on the number of times the system-wide load crosses over a 
certain quantity from below. Next, they multiply the estimated number of startups by the cost per 
startup to arrive at their estimate of start-up costs. This approach has the advantage of using a 
method that is straightforward to incorporate start-up costs in the estimation of the competitive 
price level. 
 
2.3 Model Assumptions 
I utilize data on prices, demand, power production, and generators within the PJM region to 
estimate the hourly competitive price level over three years from the beginning of 2016 to the end 
of 2018. Estimated competitive prices are derived following methods outlined in Borenstein, 
Bushnell, and Wolak (2002). Hourly aggregate marginal cost of generation curves are 
constructed, and the competitive price levels are determined based on their intersections with 
observed hourly electricity loads. The estimated competitive price level is compared to the 
system-wide electricity price for each time period to determine the degree of market power. 
Bigger deviations between the system-wide market price and the estimated competitive price 
level represent more evidence that power plants exercise market power.  
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Power plants are assumed to always be in one of two states: (1) actively producing power 
at maximum capacity, or (2) shut down. Several assumptions are made with respect to the price-
taking power plants, treatment of hydroelectric power, and treatment of net imports in order to 
derive an hourly residual demand that would be satisfied with fossil fuel generation in a 
competitive market environment. The focus is on fossil fuel plants for assessing the degree of 
market power abuses because nuclear, wind, solar, and other renewables are treated as must-run 
power plants with an effective zero marginal cost of generation. Therefore, the observed levels of 
generation from these power plants are subtracted from the actual load to obtain a residual 
demand quantity that is satisfied with fossil fuel generation. Aggregate marginal cost of fossil 
fuel generation curves are constructed for each hour. The hourly residual demand level and 
aggregate marginal cost of generation curve are used to derive the competitive price level for 
each hour. The essential mechanics of the model use output, measured by metered load, and 
aggregate marginal cost to determine the hourly competitive electricity price. The deviation 
between the estimated competitive price and the observed system-wide market price is then used 
to assess the degree of market power.  
 
2.3.1 Start-up Costs 
The costs of starting up a fossil fuel plant, as well as other constraints such as the speed a 
fossil fuel plant can be ramped up or down, affect the operation of fossil fuel plants. With higher 
levels of renewable energy, it is expected that the residual demand served by fossil fuel plants 
will fluctuate more as we move through the diurnal cycle and transition between peak and off-
peak periods. This pattern results in more frequent start-ups and shutdowns of fossil fuel plants 
that are load-following leading to considerable impacts on the cost of operating these plants 
(Graeter and Schwartz, 2020).  
Start-up costs are not included in the marginal cost formula because they are incurred 
when a power plant transitions from an inactive state to an active state and thus are not paid when 
already in an active state. The incorporation of start-up costs in the estimation of the competitive 
price level is based on the notion that power plants will only start up if electricity prices are 
expected to be high enough to recover the start-up costs. Therefore, the basic approach I use for 
incorporating start-up costs is to compute the average start-up cost for the amount of time that the 
power plant is in full operation and add this component to the marginal operating cost in each 
time period. Since power plant data on start-ups and shutdowns are not available, I estimate this 
based on residual demand and the cost structure of individual power plants using the approach 
presented in Staffell and Green (2016). A simple illustration of this approach is contained in 
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Figure 1 (below), which shows the hourly residual demand satisfied by fossil fuels from January 
1, 2016 to January 31, 2016. The intra-day variation in residual demand in the PJM region creates 
a need for short-term operation of load-following fossil fuel power plants to serve peak demand. 
The horizontal lines represent different levels of residual demand. Generators are started up (shut 
down) when the residual demand level exceeds (falls short of) the generator’s hourly demand 
point on the aggregate marginal cost curve.1  
Figure 2-1: Residual Demand with Load Points 
 
  
More specifically, the number of start-ups from January 2016 to December 2018 is 
estimated by calculating each power plant’s hourly residual demand point 𝑄𝑛,𝑡. The value 𝑄𝑛,𝑡 is 
determined by ordering the fossil fuel plants (must-run plants are excluded) from lowest to 
highest marginal cost and calculating the cumulative sum of capacity. Then, if the observed 
hourly level of residual demand 𝑄𝑡, which is the demand level served by fossil fuel generation 
after accounting for all of the must-run generation, exceeds the quantity 𝑄𝑛,𝑡, the nth power plant 
will start up. Likewise, if 𝑄𝑡 falls below 𝑄𝑛,𝑡 then the nth power plant will shut down. The 
                                                 
1 This model assumes that the lower marginal cost power plants are started up before those with higher 
marginal costs. However, it may be optimal from an average cost perspective to dispatch a lower start-up 
cost/higher marginal cost power plant instead of a higher start-up cost/lower marginal cost power plant 
(Joskow and Kahn, 2002; Mansur, 2008). This leads to a possible overestimation of start-up costs (and, 
thus, marginal costs). The number of start-ups is also over-estimated since there is no allowance for fossil 
fuel plants to operate at a minimum load level. These shortcomings may result in a higher estimated 




horizontal lines in Figure 1 (above) represent three different residual demand points: 60,000 MW, 
70,000 MW, and 80,000 MW and are used for the purpose of illustration. When observed hourly 
residual demand crosses over the 70,000 MW residual demand point from below to above, any 
generators with hourly residual demand points <=70,000 MW will be turned on. When the actual 
hourly residual demand level crosses over the 70,000 MW residual demand point from above to 
below, any generator with an hourly residual point equal to or greater than 70,000 MW will stop 
producing power. The estimated number of start-ups is multiplied by the start-up cost (in $/MW 
of capacity) to obtain a total start-up cost. Estimated start-up costs for coal and natural gas 
generators were obtained from a study by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) 
(Kumar, Besuner, Lefton, Agan, and Hilleman, 2012). The total start-up cost is divided by the 
total power production (in MWh) over the period of continuous operation from starting up to 
shutting down in order to obtain a start-up cost per MWh of power production.  
 
2.3.2 Power plant Assumptions 
Following the methodology of Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak (2002), the estimation of 
the marginal cost of power production was simplified by segmenting generators based on fuel 
type into two groups: (1) generators that are price takers (must-run power plants), and (2) 
generators that influence the system-wide electricity price. Hydroelectric, nuclear, wind, solar, 
and other renewable fuel types are considered price takers in the wholesale electricity market. 
These power plants represented approximately 22 percent of the total installed capacity in the 
PJM region in 2016 (see the appendix). Coal, natural gas, oil, and biomass power plants are 
considered to have an influence on price. Collectively, these fuel types represented the other 78 
percent of installed capacity in the PJM region in 2016.  
The hourly observed generation of the price taking power plants is used to obtain a 
residual level of demand that is served by fossil-fuel and other power plants. Nuclear, wind, and 
solar are considered to be must-run generation having zero marginal costs. I also assume that 
hydroelectric power plants are price takers and would follow the same observed generation 
schedule in a perfectly competitive market. Fossil fuel and other generators are combined in a 
second group. The marginal cost of generation for power plants in the second group is estimated 
based on heat rates (the amount of energy required to generate one MWh of electricity) obtained 
from 2016 eGRID data, the price of fossil fuels, and data on variable operations and maintenance 
costs. The heat rate is given as mmBTU/MWh. Prices for fossil fuels are the delivered price to 
U.S. power plants quoted in terms of $/mmBTU. The The fuel price and heat rate are used to 




2.3.3 PJM Transmission 
PJM has many transmission ties between its territory and neighboring areas and, most of 
the time, the PJM region is a net importer of power. The large amount of transmission capacity in 
the PJM region and neighboring territories helps to facilitate the least-cost dispatch of generation 
among neighboring areas and promotes market efficiencies within the PJM region. Given the 
large number of interconnections, it is reasonable to assume that there are no transmission 
constraints between areas. It follows from this simplifying assumption that the marginal plant 
exporting power to PJM has a marginal cost equal to the day-ahead system-wide price in the PJM 
region, assuming that power plants outside the PJM region behave in a perfectly competitive 
manner. The assumption of no congestion between the PJM region and neighboring territories is 
also consistent with our approach to abstract away from transmission congestion within the PJM 
region to make it possible to compare the estimated competitive benchmark price to the system-
wide market price, which is the energy price without transmission congestion and transmission 
losses. Section 2.3.4 (below) discusses the comparison to the system-wide energy price, which is 
determined with no transmission congestion and losses, to determine the degree market power is 
exercised in the PJM region. I follow Borenstein, Bushnell and Wollak (2002) and make a second 
simplifying assumption that power plants exporting power to the PJM region are price takers. 
That is, power plants outside the PJM region do not behave strategically to alter the system-wide 
market price in the PJM region by withholding capacity.2  
 
2.3.4 Marginal Cost Calculation 
The marginal cost of fossil fuel power plants and other generation, such as biomass, is a 
function of average heat rates, variable operations and maintenance costs, and fuel costs. The 
aggregate marginal cost curve is then constructed using the capacities and calculated marginal 
cost of each power plant. For the calculating marginal cost, the heat rate gives the efficiency with 
which the power plant converts thermal energy to output energy. More precisely, the heat rate is 
the ratio of thermal energy required to output energy. A heat rate of 3.412 mmBTU/MWh is 
perfect efficiency since one KWh of electricity has the same amount of energy as 3,412 BTU. I 
                                                 
2 Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak (2002) provide the following logic to demonstrate the conservativeness 
of this assumption. They reason that if the converse was true, then the level of observed net imports would 
be lower than the quantity of net imports assuming power plants exporting to PJM behave in a perfectly 
competitive manner. Therefore, if this simplifying assumption fails, the estimated competitive benchmark 
price will be biased upward and measurement of the degree of market power will biased downward. 
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use the 2016 eGRID data3 to obtain heat rates in terms of mmBTU/MWh for every fossil-fuel 
power plant within the PJM balancing authority. The prices for fossil fuels and other fuel types 
were obtained from the EIA in terms of $/mmBTU. Variable operations and maintenance costs 
were also obtained from the EIA for different fossil fuel types. The eGRID data include heat rates 
for each power plant. Therefore, the available data allow for heterogeneous heat rates. The data 
on variable operations and maintenance costs vary by fuel type, so variable operations and 
maintenance costs are homogenous across power plants of the same fuel type. The following 
equation gives the marginal cost of generation: 
𝑀𝐶 = 𝐻𝑅 ∗ 𝐹 + 𝑉𝑂𝑀        (1) 
where  
HR is the heat rate in mmBTU/MWh, 
F is the fuel cost in $/mmBTU, 
and VOM is the variable operations & maintenance cost per MWh. 
Fuel prices were obtained from the EIA’s Monthly Energy Review (2020). The cost of distillate 
fuel is used for Oil generation. The fuel prices are given in terms of the cost of delivery of the 
fuel at electric generating plants (in $/mmBTU, including taxes).  
2.4 Electricity Prices and Loads 
PJM operates two different electricity markets: a day-ahead market and real-time market. 
The real-time market determines the spot price of electricity at five-minute intervals based on the 
actual state of the transmission grid. The day-ahead market for electricity determines hourly 
prices for the next day. Both the day-ahead and real-time markets for electricity use locational 
marginal pricing. Settlement of the day-ahead market is based on lowest cost and optimal 
conditions in the transmission grid, and almost all generation is offered through the day-ahead 
market. Normal real-time operating conditions in the transmission grid will produce real-time 
prices that are similar to the day-ahead prices, and virtual bids drive convergence in the day-
ahead and real-time prices. However, if unexpected shocks such as outages occur, the spread 
between real-time and day-ahead prices will widen. Therefore, real-time prices exhibit more 
volatility compared to day-ahead prices. Since almost all generation is committed through the 
day-ahead market, I use the day-ahead system energy price. Day-ahead system energy prices are 
obtained from the PJM public database (PJM Data Miner 2, 2019). The system-wide market 
price is defined as the market-clearing price without any congestion costs or transmission losses. 
Using locational marginal pricing, the price at each node can be decomposed into three 
                                                 




components: the system-wide energy price, cost of transmission loss, and a transmission 
congestion cost. The system-wide energy price is computed by netting out the costs of 
transmission loss and congestion which create price differentials between different locations.  
Because the system-wide energy price is the price without costs of congestion and 
transmission losses, it is comparable to the modeled competitive benchmark price level which 
also does not account for transmission congestion. Even though power plants are actually 
dispatched out of least cost order due to transmission congestion, the locational marginal prices 
are not comparable to the modeled competitive benchmark price since the competitive benchmark 
price is determined from a least cost dispatch assuming optimal conditions with no transmission 
congestion. In addition, I use the day-ahead system-wide energy price instead of the real-time 
system-wide energy price because the modeled competitive benchmark price assumes optimal 
conditions in the transmission grid. The real-time system energy price can diverge from the day-
ahead system energy price if there is an unexpected major outage, for example, that would result 
in the re-dispatch of power plants out of merit order, which is the ordering of power plants from 
lowest to highest marginal costs.   
Appendix D shows the average electricity prices by hour of day and for dates by month 
and year from Jan 2016 to December 2018. Peak hours are usually considered to be from 7am to 
10pm. The electricity prices are the highest between 6am and 9pm which corresponds closely to 
the usual peak period definition. Electricity prices in the PJM region are generally highest during 
the summer and winter months. There was a spike in prices in January 2018 attributed to a 
shortage in the supply of natural gas due to unseasonably cold temperatures. Temperatures were 
also lower than normal during March/April 2018. Figures 2-2 and 2-3 below show the level of 
residual demand served by fossil fuels. Residual demand levels are generally the highest during 
the summer and winter months.  
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Figure 2-2: Residual Demand Box and Whisker Plot (Jan 2016 - Dec 2018) 
 
Notes: The data are sourced from PJM Data Miner 2 (2019). The boxes show the interquartile 
range for each month and the whiskers show the max and min values for residual demand. 
 
Figure 2-3: Residual Demand (Jan 2016 - Dec 2018) 
 
Notes: Data sourced from PJM Data Miner 2. 
 
2.5 Marginal Cost of Generation 
The hourly marginal cost of generation is determined by the intersection of the aggregate 
marginal cost curve with the residual metered load. The residual metered load is calculated for 
each hour of each day by first subtracting the observed generation from hydroelectric, nuclear, 
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storage, solar, wind, and other renewables from the metered load. PJM provides data on the 
observed generation by fuel type for each hour of each day. Using these data, I calculate the 
residual quantity of metered load that is satisfied with fossil fuel generation. The amount of 
capacity that is allocated for regulation reserve is added to the residual quantity of the metered 
load. However, it should be noted that the amount of capacity that clears the PJM Regulation 
Market is a small percentage of the residual metered load, so it is not material to the marginal cost 
calculation. Nonetheless, this capacity is not available for satisfying the metered load, and 
therefore it needs to be added in to improve the accuracy of the marginal cost calculation (see 
PJM Manual 11).  
Additionally, the aggregate marginal cost curve is adjusted by accounting for the effects 
of forced outages. A forced outage means the power plant has no capacity available for energy 
production. This can be due to scheduled maintenance or an unexpected breakdown, for example. 
Unexpected forced outages will have an immediate effect on the real-time market, but an outage 
will also impact the day-ahead system energy price for the duration of the outage period. The 
competitive benchmark price will increase when lower marginal cost plants experience forced 
outages because these are taken out of the aggregate marginal cost calculation. If forced outages 
are not incorporated into the model, there will be a tendency to underestimate the competitive 
price and thus overestimate the degree of market power. Forced outages are applied to the power 
plant capacities in each hour of each day using a simulation method presented in Kumar, Shivani, 
Deepika, and Aman (2013) and Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak (2002). As in their models, 
forced outages are treated as a stochastic component of the model. Power plants are assumed to 
be in one of two possible states. They either have 100 percent of capacity available for power 
production or zero percent available due to a forced outage. The forced outages are assumed to 
last for a one-month period of time. PJM provides monthly data on the Equivalent Demand 
Forced Outage Rate by generation type and nameplate capacity. PJM Manual 22 defines the 
Equivalent Demand Forced Outage Rate as the proportion of time a power plant is unavailable 
due to a forced outage. The probability of the two possible states can be described as follows: 
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝑠) = {1−𝑝
𝑝
        (2) 
where p is the probability of an outage. The probability p is determined for each power plant for 
each month from the PJM data on Equivalent Demand Forced Outage Rates. Simulations of 
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forced outages are run for each month to determine the sensitivity of the marginal cost of 
generation to forced outages.4  
After the forced outages are determined, the fossil fuel power plants are ordered by their 
constant marginal cost in ascending order. Section 2.3.4 (above) describes the methodology for 
determining each power plant’s monthly constant marginal cost. The marginal cost of fossil fuel 
generation is determined for each hour of each day by the marginal power plant required to 
satisfy the residual metered load. Figure 2-4 (below) shows the aggregate marginal cost curves 
for January 2016, January 2017, and January 2018. Tables 2-1 and 2-2 (below) compare the 
capacity-weighted marginal cost of coal and natural gas generation. Natural gas power plants 
have a higher capacity-weighted marginal cost compared to coal power plants in every month of 
2018. In the warmer months of 2016, the capacity-weighted marginal cost of natural gas power 
plants dropped below that of coal because the price of natural gas was relatively low. The 
capacity-weighted marginal cost of natural gas power plants increased during months when the 
price of natural gas increased due to unseasonably cold temperatures.  
Figure 2-4: Aggregate Marginal Cost Curves 
 
 
                                                 
4 The simulations are implemented in Microsoft Excel with the BINOM.INV function. The number of trials 
is set to 1, the probability of an outage is determined by the Equivalent Demand Forced Outage Rate, and 
the RAND function is used to get the criterion value. According to Microsoft Excel documentation, the 
RAND function can be used to generate a random number from a uniform distribution with a support less 
than or equal to 1 and greater than or equal to 0. The BINOM.INV function produces the smallest value for 
which the Bernoulli CDF is greater than or equal to the criterion value. For example, if the criterion value is 
0.7 and probability of a forced outage is 0.2, then the BINOM.INV will return a value of 0. In each 
simulation, the RAND function is used to generate a sequence of random numbers for each power plant for 
each month. The sequence of random numbers and Equivalent Demand Forced Outage Rates are used to 
determine which state each power plant is in for each month. I ran 100 simulations to determine the 
sensitivity of the marginal cost of generation to forced outages.  
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Table 2-1: Capacity-weighted Average Marginal Cost of Coal Generation 
Month Year 2016 Year 2018 
Jan 34.0 33.3 
Feb 33.9 33.3 
Mar 34.8 32.8 
Apr 34.6 33.3 
May 34.6 33.0 
Jun 33.7 33.0 
Jul 33.9 33.1 
Aug 33.9 33.1 
Sep 34.0 33.0 
Oct 33.3 33.0 
Nov 33.4 33.1 
Dec 34.4 32.0 
Notes: The capacity-weighted average marginal cost is the average marginal cost of power plants 
weighted by the capacity of each power plant. Since the inputs into the marginal cost calculation 
are monthly fuel prices, heat rates, and variable operations and maintenance costs, the marginal 
cost of a power plant will change on a monthly basis. Therefore, we calculate the capacity-
weighted average marginal cost on a monthly basis averaging over all of the power plants.  
 
Table 2-2: Capacity-weighted Average Marginal Cost of Gas Generation, 2016 and 2018 
Month Year 2016 Year 2018 
Jan 34.3 54.6 
Feb 31.0 40.3 
Mar 26.3 35.9 
Apr 28.2 35.4 
May 27.9 34.5 
Jun 30.7 35.2 
Jul 33.8 37.0 
Aug 33.6 36.8 
Sep 34.8 35.2 
Oct 35.4 38.0 
Nov 34.3 45.9 




2.6 Discussion and Results 
Discussion and results are presented in the following sections, first without start-up costs 
and then with start-up costs included.  
 
2.6.1 Estimation of the Competitive Price Level without Start-up Costs  
The results below compare the competitive benchmark price to the day-ahead system 
energy price. The difference between the competitive benchmark price and the day-ahead system 
energy price as a percent of the competitive benchmark price is used as a measure of market 
power. Figure 2-5 (below) shows that the day-ahead system energy price is typically higher than 
the competitive benchmark price, more so during peak periods. The results also show that the 
competitive benchmark price tends to be higher compared to the day-ahead system energy price 
during nighttime, which is the off-peak period. These results are consistent with the expectation 
that more opportunities exist to exercise market power during peak periods. During peak periods, 
there is a greater likelihood for power plants to be a pivotal supplier due to transmission 
congestion.5 These power plants may anticipate that they will have a very strong strategic 
position because low-cost competition may be unable to respond due to transmission congestion. 
Market participants are expected to have more opportunities to exercise market power under these 
market conditions, and, therefore, we expect to see that the day-ahead system energy price is 
higher than the competitive benchmark price. The consistency of the results with the expectations 
provides additional confidence in the general approach to modeling the competitive benchmark 
price.  
The deviance between the system-wide electricity price and the estimated competitive 
benchmark price suggests that market power mitigation in the PJM Region could be more 
effective at preventing the exercise of market power. I believe this is largely due to how PJM 
applies the pivotal supplier test, which looks only at single transmission constraints and focuses 
on whether a single power plant is a pivotal supplier. First, the pivotal supplier test may fail to 
detect the exercise of market power since it only looks at a single transmission constraint and 
does not consider the possibility that another constraint would prevent other power plants from 
supplying additional power. In other words, the relevant market for determining a pivotal supplier 
                                                 
5 Market power is exercised when power plants withhold power so that their marginal cost is less than the 
market clearing price but equal to marginal revenue. When power is withheld, more expensive power plants 
become the marginal plant. The system-wide energy price will reflect the clearing of more expensive power 
when less expensive power plants exercise monopoly power through withholding capacity (Wolak and 
Patrick, 2001). Capacity is typically withheld during peak periods when there is more transmission 
congestion, since firms are unlikely to possess sufficient market power in the absence of transmission 
congestion (Borenstein, Bushnell, and Stoft, 2000). 
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is all of the power plants that could relieve the single constraint (constraint A). However, it is 
possible that other constraints would prevent these power plants from relieving constraint A. 
Second, under this application of the pivotal supplier test, it is possible for the exercise of market 
power to go undetected if no one power plant can manipulate electricity prices by itself, but 
power plants acting in concert are able to manipulate electricity prices. For example, a power 
plant may expect other power plants to engage in anti-competitive behavior, and therefore find it 
profitable to withhold capacity and/or submit an offer price that exceeds the competitive 
benchmark price.  
The results also show that the system-wide market price deviates the most from the 
competitive market price during the colder months. February 2017 was unseasonably warm 
which produced a decrease in natural gas prices and metered load. March 2016 and February 
2018 also produced warmer than average temperatures across the PJM region. The average 
difference between the estimated competitive price the system-wide market price in the months of 
March 2016, February 2017, and February 2018 is smaller compared to most of the other winter 
months from January 2016 to December 2018. The weather in March/April 2018 was 
unseasonably cold which produced higher natural gas prices in March/April/May 2018 because 
natural gas is also used for heating. The deviation between the system-wide market price and the 
competitive price widened over these three months. We also observe larger average deviations 
between the estimated competitive price and the system-wide electricity price during March/April 
2017 when the weather across the Mid-Atlantic was colder than normal. Even after accounting 
for the spike in natural gas prices, I find that the system-wide market price in January 2018 
departed significantly from the competitive level. This month corresponds to a shortage in natural 
gas due to temperatures that were colder than normal and a spike up in the metered load. My 
results suggest that that there were more opportunities for market participants to exercise market 
power when the metered load spiked up in January 2018, even after accounting for the spike in 
the system-wide market price stemming from the spike in demand.  
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Figure 2-5: Day-ahead System Energy Price and Competitive Benchmark 
 





















Jan -90.4% -3.9% 12.1% 35.4% 198.2% 20.4% 
Feb -57.5% -9.9% 4.9% 28.8% 196.3% 13.1% 
Mar -56.9% -12.1% 0.6% 14.9% 94.7% 2.6% 
Apr -32.8% -3.5% 12.3% 35.7% 115.1% 18.7% 
May -64.6% -18.7% 2.5% 16.4% 148.0% 0.7% 
Jun -81.9% -19.5% 4.1% 28.9% 129.8% 5.9% 
Jul -73.6% -11.7% 4.7% 29.8% 191.0% 12.2% 
Aug -57.6% -11.1% 9.1% 41.5% 221.8% 16.8% 
Sep -90.4% -14.7% 2.8% 33.7% 251.6% 14.0% 
Oct -38.0% -6.9% 14.5% 35.1% 181.6% 17.7% 
Nov -29.7% -7.7% 3.0% 22.3% 91.8% 8.5% 
Dec -21.2% 2.9% 13.6% 30.6% 169.7% 20.0% 
Notes: The summary statistics are calculated from hourly data on the deviation between the 






















Jan -19.5% 2.0% 11.5% 29.2% 177.4% 17.7% 
Feb -26.7% -3.6% 4.9% 16.6% 95.1% 8.5% 
Mar -26.7% 1.1% 17.0% 41.0% 254.3% 25.9% 
Apr -28.0% -2.8% 21.0% 43.2% 149.9% 22.3% 
May -40.7% -5.4% 15.4% 34.6% 328.7% 18.8% 
Jun -57.6% -16.4% 1.2% 24.3% 99.4% 4.8% 
Jul -60.1% -14.8% 4.0% 33.5% 194.4% 11.8% 
Aug -57.5% -15.4% 0.1% 24.7% 119.2% 6.4% 
Sep -58.1% -15.1% 3.0% 35.6% 558.8% 18.1% 
Oct -42.6% -5.8% 17.8% 38.3% 128.9% 20.5% 
Nov -31.9% -2.7% 12.7% 37.6% 162.7% 20.3% 





















Jan -17.2% 13.3% 51.3% 160.8% 497.5% 99.1% 
Feb -30.2% -12.6% -2.4% 10.0% 189.0% 2.8% 
Mar -23.0% 7.5% 18.8% 39.6% 229.7% 28.1% 
Apr -18.2% 13.2% 38.5% 59.6% 166.0% 39.6% 
May -35.9% -7.5% 31.9% 61.8% 280.7% 36.1% 
Jun -33.1% -16.2% 7.7% 35.5% 256.3% 14.4% 
Jul -45.5% -13.5% 8.7% 37.5% 227.3% 16.1% 
Aug -23.9% -10.0% 11.4% 40.4% 132.9% 17.8% 
Sep -29.4% -6.6% 20.9% 48.4% 256.4% 26.9% 
Oct -24.1% 8.3% 32.2% 59.0% 270.9% 39.9% 
Nov -37.1% 29.7% 44.1% 64.1% 157.8% 45.9% 
Dec -20.9% 7.4% 22.3% 33.8% 110.5% 22.0% 
 
 Simulations of forced outages were run using the methodology described in Section 2.5. 
Tables 6, 7, and 8 (below) show summary statistics for the difference between the competitive 
benchmark price and the day-ahead system energy price as a percent of the competitive 
benchmark price. The results show some variation in the degree of market power across the 
simulations. This is consistent with expectations based on how the simulations were 
implemented. Since the probability of a forced outage in the simulations does not depend on time 
of day, the simulated outages should be considered unexpected. Unplanned outages can have a 
noticeable effect on wholesale electricity prices. In practice, most outages are planned to occur 
during off-peak periods to allow for maintenance to be performed with minimal impact on market 
operations. Therefore, the computed competitive benchmark price is higher than it should be, 
















Month Min First Quartile Median Third 
Quartile 
Max 
Jan 18.4% 20.1% 20.3% 20.9% 21.2% 
Feb 11.3% 12.9% 13.2% 13.5% 13.8% 
Mar 1.4% 2.4% 2.7% 2.8% 3.6% 
Apr 17.5% 18.5% 18.8% 19.0% 19.5% 
May -0.9% 0.4% 0.6% 1.1% 1.6% 
Jun 4.7% 5.1% 6.0% 6.5% 7.1% 
Jul 7.2% 10.4% 12.3% 14.4% 15.9% 
Aug 14.3% 15.3% 16.7% 17.7% 21.8% 
Sep 11.6% 13.5% 14.1% 14.8% 15.3% 
Oct 17.1% 17.4% 17.7% 18.0% 18.4% 
Nov 8.1% 8.3% 8.5% 8.7% 8.7% 
Dec 18.1% 19.1% 20.2% 20.9% 21.6% 
Notes: For each simulation, the average deviation between the system-wide energy price and the 
competitive benchmark price as a percentage of the competitive benchmark price was calculated 
for each month. Summary statistics were calculated to show the distribution of the average 
















Month Min First Quartile Median Third 
Quartile 
Max 
Jan 15.6% 17.0% 17.7% 18.3% 20.3% 
Feb 6.2% 7.6% 8.7% 9.6% 9.9% 
Mar 23.7% 25.1% 26.0% 26.6% 27.3% 
Apr 21.1% 21.9% 22.5% 22.7% 23.3% 
May 17.2% 18.3% 18.8% 19.6% 20.2% 
Jun 3.0% 4.3% 4.8% 5.3% 6.3% 
Jul 10.1% 10.6% 11.7% 12.8% 14.1% 
Aug 3.0% 5.5% 6.6% 7.6% 8.2% 
Sep 16.8% 17.5% 18.2% 18.6% 19.5% 
Oct 19.8% 20.1% 20.4% 20.9% 21.4% 
Nov 18.2% 19.9% 20.5% 20.9% 22.0% 
















Month Min First Quartile Median Third 
Quartile 
Max 
Jan 92.4% 97.7% 98.8% 100.1% 106.8% 
Feb -0.5% 2.1% 3.0% 3.6% 5.1% 
Mar 26.5% 27.5% 28.1% 28.7% 29.6% 
Apr 38.3% 39.3% 39.5% 39.8% 41.1% 
May 33.8% 35.0% 36.7% 37.2% 37.9% 
Jun 12.6% 13.6% 14.4% 15.1% 16.3% 
Jul 10.6% 15.2% 16.5% 17.7% 18.3% 
Aug 12.1% 16.8% 17.6% 19.3% 21.5% 
Sep 24.1% 26.2% 26.7% 27.9% 28.6% 
Oct 38.9% 39.5% 39.8% 40.3% 41.0% 
Nov 43.7% 45.0% 46.1% 46.6% 48.0% 
Dec 20.3% 21.4% 22.0% 22.6% 23.7% 
 
2.6.1.1 Sensitivity of Competitive Benchmark to the Quantity of Net Imports 
Data show that PJM is often a net importer of power. We note the following relationship 
between the competitive benchmark price and the level of net imports. If the competitive price 
level is lower (higher) than the system-wide market price, then the level of net imports would 
decrease (increase) from the observed level in the PJM data. If the decrease in the level of net 
imports is not accounted for in the model, then my measurement of the degree market power is 
exercised will be biased upward. PJM does not provide data that would enable me to construct 
supply curves for imports and exports. Therefore, instead of making the quantity of net imports a 
function of price in the model, I use sensitivity testing to test the robustness of the results to 
different levels of net imports. Table 2-9 shows that net imports are a small percentage of the total 
metered load. Therefore, I do not expect significant variation in the results of the model across the 
scenarios in the sensitivity testing. The results of the sensitivity testing presented below confirm 





Table 2-9: Net imports as a Percentage of Total Metered Load 
 Net imports as a percentage of total metered load 
Month Year 2016 Year 2017 Year 2018 
Jan 3.00% 1.50% 1.70% 
Feb 2.90% 2.10% 2.20% 
Mar 3.00% 2.60% 0.80% 
Apr 2.20% 4.30% 0.90% 
May 1.60% 3.80% 1.90% 
Jun 4.00% 3.60% 3.00% 
Jul 3.60% 3.40% 3.00% 
Aug 3.10% 3.30% 3.50% 
Sep 4.30% 4.00% 4.00% 
Oct 4.40% 3.00% 4.10% 
Nov 2.20% 2.10% 2.20% 
Dec 2.80% 2.90% 3.80% 
 
I tested the sensitivity of different levels of net imports by shocking the level of imported 
(exported) generation downward (upward) compared to the observed level of net imports. For 
each shock scenario, I calculate the residual demand that is satisfied with fossil fuel generation. 
The quantity of imported (exported) generation was shocked downward (upward) by 15%, 25%, 
50%, and 60% of the observed level to account for the potential bias upward in the estimated 
degree of market power discussed above. The results presented in Tables 2-10, 2-11, and 2-12 
(below) confirm this expectation and show the degree of market power has minor variation across 
the shocks applied to net imports. These results indicate the model outputs based on the observed 
level of net imports are robust to different levels of net imports and comparable to results that 


























Jan 20.3% 20.1% 19.8% 19.7% 20.4% 
Feb 12.9% 12.9% 12.6% 12.5% 13.1% 
Mar 2.4% 2.4% 2.1% 2.1% 2.6% 
Apr 18.6% 18.5% 18.4% 18.3% 18.7% 
May 0.7% 0.6% 0.5% 0.4% 0.7% 
Jun 5.8% 5.7% 5.5% 5.4% 5.9% 
Jul 11.8% 11.5% 10.8% 10.5% 12.2% 
Aug 16.5% 16.3% 15.7% 15.5% 16.8% 
Sep 13.8% 13.7% 13.4% 13.3% 14.0% 
Oct 17.6% 17.5% 17.2% 17.1% 17.7% 
Nov 8.5% 8.5% 8.4% 8.4% 8.5% 


























Jan 17.6% 17.4% 17.1% 17.0% 17.7% 
Feb 8.3% 8.3% 8.0% 7.9% 8.5% 
Mar 25.7% 25.7% 25.4% 25.4% 25.9% 
Apr 22.2% 22.1% 22.0% 21.9% 22.3% 
May 18.8% 18.7% 18.6% 18.5% 18.8% 
Jun 4.7% 4.6% 4.4% 4.3% 4.8% 
Jul 11.4% 11.1% 10.4% 10.1% 11.8% 
Aug 6.1% 5.9% 5.3% 5.1% 6.4% 
Sep 17.9% 17.8% 17.5% 17.4% 18.1% 
Oct 20.4% 20.3% 20.0% 19.9% 20.5% 
Nov 20.3% 20.3% 20.2% 20.2% 20.3% 


























Jan 99.0% 98.8% 98.5% 98.4% 99.1% 
Feb 2.6% 2.6% 2.3% 2.2% 2.8% 
Mar 27.9% 27.9% 27.6% 27.6% 28.1% 
Apr 39.5% 39.4% 39.3% 39.2% 39.6% 
May 36.1% 36.0% 35.9% 35.8% 36.1% 
Jun 14.3% 14.2% 14.0% 13.9% 14.4% 
Jul 15.7% 15.4% 14.7% 14.4% 16.1% 
Aug 17.5% 17.3% 16.7% 16.5% 17.8% 
Sep 26.7% 26.6% 26.3% 26.2% 26.9% 
Oct 39.8% 39.7% 39.4% 39.3% 39.9% 
Nov 45.9% 45.9% 45.8% 45.8% 45.9% 
Dec 21.4% 21.2% 20.4% 20.2% 22.0% 
 
2.6.2 Estimation of the Competitive Price Level with Start-up Costs 
The results presented in the previous sections indicate that not all of the components of 
operating cost that determine the competitive price level have been captured because we would 
expect see consecutive months with smaller deviations from the system-wide electricity price 
during time periods when demand is low and/or fuel prices are lower. The fact that the results 
indicate higher levels of market power in every month of every year in my sample period 
suggests I am missing an important component of operating cost. In this section, I discuss the 
inclusion of start-up costs and competitive benchmark prices with and without start-up costs. The 
results presented below suggest that start-up costs are an important component of the system-
wide electricity price.  
The figures below plot the estimated number of start-ups and estimated number of 
operating hours for all of the coal and natural gas power plants in the PJM region using the 
methodology presented in Staffell and Green (2016). More than 70 percent of installed capacity 
in the PJM region is coal and natural Gas. Tables 2-1 and 2-2 (above) show the capacity-weighted 
average marginal cost of natural gas power plants is below the capacity-weighted average 
marginal cost of coal power plants from March 2016 to June 2016 when the price of natural gas 
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was low compared to prices in 2017 and 2018. From September 2018 to December 2018, the 
price of natural gas was relatively high, and the capacity-weighted average marginal cost of the 
natural gas power plants is above that of coal power plants. Figure 2-6 below shows that most of 
the natural Gas capacity is estimated to be operated as peaking power plant. That is, most of the 
natural Gas capacity is estimated to have fewer start-up events and a smaller number of operating 
hours compared to coal power plants, which were operated as baseload and mid-merit power 
from September 2018 to December 2018. Figure 2-6 below shows that most of the coal power 
plants are providing baseload power (high number of operating hours/low number of start-up 
events) or mid-merit power (high number of operating hours/high number of start-up events) 
when the price of coal is lower than natural gas.  
During the period from March 2016 to June 2016, natural gas power plants had a lower 
capacity-weighted MC compared to coal power plants. Figure 2-7 below shows that most of the 
natural gas capacity is estimated to be operated as a baseload power plant or mid-merit power 
plant. Most of the coal capacity is operated as a mid-merit power plant. Since coal was relatively 
more expensive, the coal power plants operated during a fewer number of hours compared to the 
period from September 2018 to December 2018. Natural gas power plants typically have a higher 
number of operating hours compared to the period from September 2018 to December 2018 when 
generating electricity from natural gas power plants is comparatively more expensive. 
The results also show fewer start-ups during the period from March 2016 to June 2016 
compared to the period from September 2018 to December 2018. This is consistent with 
expectations because the metered load is lower from March 2016 to June 2016 compared to the 
period from September 2018 to December 2018, so the electricity prices have smaller peaks. The 
prices in the appendix also show that electricity prices typically peak twice per day during colder 
months, once during the morning ramp-up and once in the evening. This pattern of demand also 
results in more frequent start-up and shutdown events for peaking and mid-merit power plants.  




Figure 2-7: Estimated Number of Start-ups and Operating Hours (Mar 2016 – Jun 2016) 
 
Figure 2-8 shows the estimated average hourly competitive prices with and without start-
up costs compared to the average system-wide electricity price over the time period from January 
2016 to December 2018. The results with start-up costs follow a little more closely the pattern of 
system-wide electricity prices. However, the similar trend in estimated competitive prices 
indicates that this simplistic approach to estimating the number of start-ups may not adequately 
capture the inter-temporal tradeoffs in production decisions. Nonetheless, this approach will tend 
to overestimate the competitive benchmark price because it does not allow for the possibility of 
power plants running at minimum load, thus reducing the possibility of concluding that there is 
market power even if it does exist. The competitive benchmark price without start-up costs does 
have a little less variation. The level of competitive benchmark prices with start-up costs is also 
closer to the mean level of system-wide electricity prices. This provides some evidence that the 
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market-based supply bids incorporate start-up costs. There is still evidence of market power 
during peak hours when the system-wide electricity price exceeds the estimated competitive 
price. However, the results also show the estimated competitive price exceeds the system-wide 
electricity price during off-peak hours by a similar margin. My model assumes the hourly supply 
bids incorporate the pro-rata share of start-up costs. However, these results suggest that power 
plants may only incorporate start-up costs in their supply bids during peak hours when the 
expected price of electricity exceeds their marginal cost.  
Figure 2-8: Competitive prices with and without Start-up Costs 
 
Notes: Hourly prices are averaged over the 1,095 days in the years 2016 to 2018. Competitive 
benchmark prices are presented for models with and without start-up costs. 
 
The results in table 2-9 below show less evidence of market power compared to the case 
without start-up costs. The system-wide electricity price exceeds the average estimated 
competitive price during the winter peak period when temperatures were colder (Nov/Dec 2016 
were unseasonably warm). These results should be interpreted as conservative because this 
approach used to incorporate start-up costs does not allow generators to produce power at levels 
between maximum and minimum output. Since power plants can only be in one of two states, 
either on or off, start-up costs are also overestimated because all start-ups are assumed to be 
“cold” start-ups (defined as starting up from shutdown) as opposed to ramping up from a 
minimum level of production which is less costly. Cold start-ups are significantly more costly 
than ramping up from a minimum level of power production. The approach also does not allow 
for the possibility that it may be more cost effective to dispatch a power plant with low start-up 
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costs and high marginal costs instead of dispatching a power plant with high start-up costs and a 
low marginal cost. In my model, power plants are dispatched according to their position along the 
aggregate marginal cost curve. Therefore, the power plant with a lower marginal cost and higher 
start-up costs would be dispatched. The overestimation of start-up costs may result in the 
underestimation of market power during the summer peak period when the estimated number of 
start-up and shutdown events for peaking and mid-merit power plants is the highest. However, the 
percentage deviation with and without start-up costs tends to be lower during the summer peak 
period compared to the winter peak period, suggesting other factors are also contributing to this 
result. I note that the price of natural gas deliveries to power plants is lower during the summer 
peak period compared to the winter peak period. As a result, the aggregate marginal cost curves 
during the winter peak months tend to be steeper with bigger jumps compared to the summer 
peak months (see the figure below, for example). This creates additional opportunities for power 
plants to profitably withhold power during the peak winter months in order to drive up the 
system-wide energy price, which may result in a higher degree of market power being exercised 
during the winter peak period. The consistency of these results gives confidence that I have 
captured all of the most important determinants of the competitive price level.  
Figure 2-9: Aggregate Marginal Cost Curves of Fossil Fuel Generation 
 
Notes: The aggregate marginal cost curves were constructed by ordering power plants by their 
















Month Year 2016 Year 2017 Year 2018 
Jan 15.5% 7.3% 73.8% 
Feb 7.6% -0.5% -5.1% 
Mar 1.9% 6.7% 11.2% 
Apr 18.0% 22.4% 23.7% 
May -1.5% 8.8% 16.7% 
Jun -8.7% -10.7% 1.5% 
Jul -5.7% -9.9% -3.1% 
Aug -6.1% -15.0% -3.3% 
Sep -11.8% -3.9% 0.9% 
Oct 0.2% 5.1% 23.3% 
Nov -14.8% 17.6% 26.2% 
Dec -0.3% 33.6% 18.2% 
 
A comparison to the results in Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak (2002) shows that the PJM 
region exhibited a smaller degree of market power, as measured by the deviation between the 
system energy price and competitive benchmark price, compared to California during the 
electricity crisis in 2000. The degree of market power in the PJM region from October 2018 to 
December 2018 when the price of natural gas spiked upward is comparable to that in California 
during the summer of 1998 before the energy crisis. We observe lower levels of market power in 
PJM during unseasonably cold months (e.g., Mar/Apr/May 2017 and Mar/Apr/May 2018) 
compared to peak periods in California. There are several reasons these results suggesting lower 
levels of market power in PJM compared to California are consistent with expectations. First, as 
mentioned above, PJM has more interconnections and a higher concentration of transmission, 
demand centers, and power plants. These differences should lead to less congestion and fewer 
pivotal suppliers, resulting in fewer opportunities to exercise market power. Additionally, I am 
comparing to a study of market power in California’s electricity market that was conducted in 
2002 when the wholesale electricity market was fairly immature. In contrast, PJM was 
established in 1997 and is market rules have matured. Therefore, I expect market monitoring and 
mitigation to be more effective at limiting the degree of market power compared to the California 
electricity market in 2000. Finally, I have captured start-ups, whereas Borenstein, Bushnell, and 
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Wolak (2002) do not account for start-ups, leading them to perhaps overestimate the degree of 
market power in California. This comparison of results also gives added credibility to the results 
produced in my study because I estimate smaller deviations between the system-wide price and 
estimated competitive price (with the exception of the Jan 2018 spike in electricity prices in PJM) 
over periods of multiple months compared to the 3-month period of time in 2000 from June 2000 
to July 2000 when California’s electricity industry was in crisis.  
 
2.7 Conclusion 
This paper analyzed the degree of market power in the PJM region from 2016 to 2018. 
The results presented in this paper show some evidence that market power was exercised, 
particularly in months having unseasonably cold temperatures and fuel price spikes as well as 
during the winter peak season. The results also show the degree of market power increases during 
the peak hours of the day. These results are consistent with expectations because there are more 
opportunities to exercise market power during peak hours. Transmission congestion during peak 
hours will lead to the presence of more pivotal suppliers. Additionally, output during peak hours 
is on a steeper part of the aggregate marginal cost curve (output during peak hours is higher). This 
creates opportunities for power plants that anticipate a strategic advantage to manipulate market 
prices by withholding supply to boost prices. PJM’s market mitigation aims to curb such abuses 
of market power ex ante by using a structural test for market power. If market power is detected 
supply offers are mitigated to a cost-based level. However, as discussed above, the application of 
the pivotal supplier test may result in failures to detect the exercise of market power. These 
results are also consistent with studies of market power in the California electricity market 
showing market power is typically exercised when temperatures increase during the warm 
summer months. My results show there are generally more opportunities to exercise market 
power in the PJM region during the cold winter months. There is also evidence of market power 
when start-up costs are incorporated.  
A future area of research would use dynamic programming to study the inter-temporal 
tradeoffs in production decisions. Power plants could be modeled as operating between max and 
min output levels, which would allow for a more accurate simulation of start-ups and shut downs 
and estimation of costs associated with ramping up and ramping down production. In reality, coal 
plants with higher start-up costs would reduce power output so they do not have to undergo a cold 
start-up (defined as starting up from a complete shutdown). My model assumes power plants are 
in one of two states, either producing power at full capacity or shut down. Since the costs 
associated with a cold start-up are higher than costs with ramping down and ramping up or 
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undergoing a hot start-up, my results with start-up costs should be a conservative estimate of the 
degree of market power, but the simplistic approach does not capture the production decisions in 
a realistic manner. That said, the model with start-up costs provides a more realistic 
representation of the power system in the PJM region than the model without, thereby allowing 
for a direct analysis of the exercise of market power within the PJM region. The results of the 




3. Chapter 2 - The Production and Use of Chilled-Water to Increase Efficiency of a 
Geothermal Power System under Different Temperature and Price Conditions 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The electricity industry continues to transition from traditional cost-of-service regulation 
to a restructured industry based on markets for electricity at the wholesale level and open-access 
to transmission. The transition to a competitive marketplace is being facilitated by several factors, 
including technological change, government policy, and institutional change in the electric utility 
industry. As the electricity industry moves towards greater competition, the generation, 
distribution, and transmission facilities are being unbundled to facilitate competition by 
increasing access to the market for power generation. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 established 
open access to the transmission system. In 1996, FERC Orders 888 and 889 “the open access 
rule” removed impediments to wholesale competition and encouraged the creation of market 
exchanges. FERC Order 2000 established the regional transmission organizations with authority 
to operate the transmission system and administer wholesale power markets. The Midwest ISO 
(MISO) was the nation’s first RTO and opened the MISO energy markets in 2005. There are 
currently many different wholesale power markets operating throughout the United States and 
covering roughly 60 percent of the territory of the United States.  
New institutions continue to be designed to reduce potential for market power by 
encouraging more independent power producers to enter the generation market. The movement to 
greater competition in the generation market has opened many opportunities for power marketers 
and independent power producers.  There is also a greater imperative for utility companies to 
develop operating strategies for mitigating risk and increasing the probability of the individual 
units being profitable.  
The policies and institutions designed to promote competition have major implications 
for development of the electric utility industry and the opportunities that exist for different 
players to profit from increased competition. This paper investigates an operating strategy from 
the perspective of a single low-temperature geothermal power plant seeking to maximize profit 
from the sale of electricity.  This paper makes an important contribution by illustrating how a 
low-temperature geothermal power plant can be flexibly dispatched to offer multiple different 
services in addition to base-load power to a utility customer. The utility industry still thinks of 
geothermal as a base-load resource, but low temperature resource geothermal power plants offer 
more flexibility than other renewable energy technologies and can be operated as variable energy 
resources. Geothermal is capable of offering firmly flexible generation because it can achieve 
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high ramp speeds. For example, geothermal is capable of ramping up and down as wind 
generation varies. Opportunities exist today for locating low temperature resource geothermal in 
many areas and dispatch it flexibly to accommodate intermittent resources and alleviate 
transmission congestion. However, boosting power output during periods with high ambient air 
temperatures and high electricity prices would greatly expand these opportunities in warmer 
climates.  
It is widely known that low-temperature geothermal resources are abundant in the United 
States. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, more than 120,000 MW of these resources (125 
– 175 degrees Celsius) have yet to be put to use (Williams et al., 2008). This abundance allows 
for considerable flexibility in decisions about siting low-temperature geothermal power plants. 
Other energy technologies, such as PHES plants and compressed air energy systems (CAES), are 
more constrained by geologic conditions and surface topologies. The disadvantage of air-cooled 
low-temperature geothermal is that power output is constrained by the difference between the 
temperature of the geothermal resource and the ambient air temperature. Since power production 
from low-temperature geothermal resources has a low thermodynamic efficiency, it is important 
to find economical ways to boost overall efficiency.     
In this paper I investigate the use of a closed-loop, chilled-water cooling and thermal 
energy storage system to boost power output during periods with high ambient air temperatures 
and high electricity prices. The chilled-water cooling system is an add-on to an air-cooled low-
temperature geothermal power plant. The system is used to exploit temporal mismatches between 
periods of higher power output and periods of high prices. Chilled water is produced during 
periods with low electricity prices and low ambient air temperatures (higher power output). Then 
the stored chilled water is used to boost power output during periods with high electricity prices 
and typically lower power output.  
The chilled-water cooling system is effectively a price arbitrage system. The concept 
presented runs counter to the common misunderstanding that geothermal should only be operated 
as base-load generation. Unlike coal-fired and nuclear generation, geothermal is flexible 
generation with high ramp rates in both the up and down directions. Therefore, geothermal is 
ideal for providing many different market and transmission services such as ancillary services. 
Although the geothermal power plant in our system operates much like base load power in that it 
does not ramp output up or down, our system does seek to increase the value of geothermal 
generation by energy arbitrage. In fact, the chilled-water cooling system is very similar to 
utilizing a power plant to provide generation during high demand periods and ramping down a 
power plant to accommodate excess intermittent generation during low demand periods. Our 
40 
 
geothermal plant does not supply generation to the power system during low demand periods. 
Instead, it uses power output to produce chilled water.  
Previous research on boosting power output of low-temperature air-cooled geothermal 
plants during higher ambient air temperature conditions has been motivated by the need for water 
conservation (Sohel et al, 2009; Ashwood and Bharathan, 2011). Water-augmented cooling 
methods, which could be employed during hot summer peak demand times, were evaluated for 
their economic value by estimating incremental increases in power production and revenue and 
computing payback periods. These “hybrid-cooling” options could be used if the geothermal 
plant is in a location with inadequate cold-water resources for cooling the power plant.  
In this paper, similar results are reported in terms of incremental power gains and revenue 
increases for a chilled-water cooling/storage system. Furthermore, since the chilled-water cooling 
system is closed-loop and is an add-on to an air-cooled system, this type of dual cooling system 
also lowers water consumption compared to evaporative cooling systems. However, unlike in 
Sohel et al. (2009) and Ashwood and Bharathan (2011), the primary motivation for installing the 
closed-loop chilled-water cooling system is not to reduce water consumption. 
Instead, the primary interest is in using this system to capture arbitrage value by storing 
low-cost energy in the form of chilled water and then using this to increase energy delivery into 
the market during summer peak demand periods. These arbitrage opportunities exist when 
periods of high power output (at low ambient air temperatures) coincide with periods of low 
electricity prices and periods of low power output (at high ambient air temperatures) coincide 
with periods of high electricity prices. The closed-loop chilled-water cooling system is a thermal 
energy storage system. The thermal reservoir is the chilled water, which is maintained at a 
temperature below the ambient air temperature. Thermal energy taken from the geothermal 
resource is used to produce chilled water, which is stored in insulated tanks for later use as a 
coolant.  
Our thermal energy storage system is similar to other energy storage technologies 
because it stores energy in the form of chilled water and the chilled water is used to boost 
electrical power production. Therefore, our system has similarities to others that store and 
discharge electricity directly. Other thermal storage systems, such as those using electrical power 
to produce chilled water during off peak periods and then using the stored chilled water to cool a 
large building during times of peak demand, are functionally similar. Ellis (2012) describes the 
use of thermal energy storage in a chilled water production system for the Texas Medical Center 
in Houston. Thermal energy storage is used to meet peak demand for chilled water, and is found 
to yield several economic benefits that favor its use over increasing chilled water production 
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capacity. First, the installation of the system was determined to be cost effective compared to 
building new production capacity. Second, the thermal energy storage system consumes less 
energy. This is because it chills water at night when temperatures are lower so that, even after 
accounting for heat gain in the storage tank and the losses associated with pumping water into and 
out of the tank, total energy consumption is lower. Third, the thermal energy storage system 
levels the demand for energy and takes advantage of using lower-cost energy to chill water. 
Oldak (2012) describes the role and benefits of thermal energy storage in demand-side 
management schemes in detail.  The benefits of leveling demand for energy are well known. 
The traditional chilled water energy storage scheme is similar to the one described here in 
some respects. Both schemes derive economic benefits from taking advantage of the diurnal 
pattern in prices. Both schemes also benefit from the energy savings associated with producing 
chilled water at night when the ambient air temperatures are lower. However, there are critical 
differences between using thermal energy storage in demand-side management programs versus 
our system, which is used for boosting power production and overall efficiency of a power plant. 
First, on the demand side there is increasing demand for chilled water to cool large buildings as 
the ambient temperature increases, which is taken as given and must be satisfied. The alternatives 
are to increase production capacity and/or install storage technology. In our system, the 
production of chilled water depends on whether the benefits of boosting power production 
outweigh the costs of consuming energy to produce the chilled water. Although both systems take 
advantage of the diurnal price pattern, our system is intended for exploiting arbitrage 
opportunities whereas the thermal energy storage system described above shifts production of 
chilled water, which must take place, to lower-cost periods.  
In Section 3.2, I describe the low-temperature geothermal plant with chilled-water 
cooling system. This also discusses the relationship between the ambient temperature and the 
existence of arbitrage opportunities that could be taken advantage of by such a system. Section 
3.2 also presents the dynamic programming model and solution method to obtain the state path 
and optimal policy function. Section 3.3 presents the results of the optimal dispatch model. 
Section 3.4 contains a discussion of the results. 
 
3.2 Methods 
3.2.1 System Studied 
The specific technology modeled is a low-temperature resource geothermal power plant 
using CO2 as the working fluid. Carbon dioxide has certain advantages over water for extracting 
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low-temperature heat (Randolph and Saar, 2011). It should be noted, however, that the results 
could be generalized to any low-temperature geothermal plant with an air-type cooling system.  
Figure 3.1 illustrates the direct CO2 Plume Geothermal (CPG) power production system 
discussed in this paper. The CO2 is sequestered underground in a warm, porous rock structure 
reservoir underneath an impervious cap rock. The hot CO2 rises by natural convection in the 
reservoir to the bottom of the production well, state (1). As it rises up the production well, the 
pressure decreases due to flow friction and the change in elevation. At the surface, state (2), the 
warm high pressure, low density CO2 passes through the turbine, state (3), which drives a 
generator to produce electric power. The CO2 then proceeds through a condenser, state (4), where 
it exits as a lower pressure, high-density liquid. The liquid then travels down the injection well 
back to the bottom of the reservoir, state (5), where it is heated as it travels toward the bottom of 
the production well and the cycle starts again. Though natural convection (e.g., a thermosiphon) 
is sufficient to drive the CO2, a pump was used to optimize the flow rate.  
Figure 3-1: Schematic of Direct CPG System 
 
Notes: This is a direct system where the CPG power plant combines electrical generation with 
CO2 sequestration. The CO2 is the geothermal fluid and the CPG power plant uses a CO2-based, 
direct-turbine for power generation. Supercritical CO2 is injected into geologic reservoirs and a 
heated CO2 is piped back to the surface for direct use and then re-injected into the geologic 
reservoir (Saar and Randolph, 2011). The water tank would be insulated to minimize heat loss. I 
estimate that we would need two 1924 KW chillers to use all the power output from the CPG 
plant to chill water during time increments when chilling water is determined to be the optimal 
use of the power output. I set the storage capacity to 9,000 m3 so that there are six hours of 
thermal energy storage (1,500 m3 of chilled water is needed to cool the power plant over one 
hour). Six hours of thermal energy storage is desirable for taking full advantage of daily arbitrage 
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opportunities because high electricity prices occur generally over a peak period of demand that 
stretched from the mid-to-late afternoon into the evening.  
 
The turbine inlet, state (2), is fixed assuming a constant CO2 mass flow rate and reservoir 
conditions. The amount of power that can be extracted from the CO2 turbine is limited by the 
exhaust pressure, which is governed by the condensing temperature of the CO2 that follows the 
ambient dry bulb air temperature. The power output from the turbine is converted to electricity in 
a generator.  It can either be sold to the grid or used to operate the two 1924 kW chillers. The 
water is chilled from 15.6°C to 10°C as this is a typical operating condition for commercially 
available air-cooled chillers. After the water has been cooled it is stored in one of the four 2,250 
m3 water tanks. When it is financially advantageous to do so, the stored chilled water is used to 
condense the CO2 instead of water that has been cooled in the cooling tower. When the stored 
chilled water temperature is less than the temperature of the water leaving the cooling tower, the 
condensing pressure and temperature of the CO2 can be reduced by switching from the cooling 
tower water to the stored chilled water. This increases the power output of the turbine and 
generates more electricity. This situation often occurs during peak summer demand. The figure 
below shows a layout of the entire above ground system, including the CO2 power components 
and the chilled water production and storage components. I note that this chilled-water cooling 
system is very similar to one presented in Ellis (2012), which found that heat loss from the 
stratified chilled water storage tank was minimal and parasitic power losses associated with 




Figure 3-2: Surface Layout of the Geothermal Power Plant with Chilled-Water Cooling 
System 
 
Assuming enough chiller capacity is available to use all of the power that is produced by 
the geothermal power plant, the amount of water chilled can be calculated using Equation 1 
where ?̇? is the cooling capacity of the chiller. 
𝑀𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 = ?̇?𝑡 𝐶𝑝∆𝑇⁄          (1) 
The change in water temperature, ΔT, is assumed to be 5.6°C. The rate of energy removal from 
the water is determined using Equation 2 where ?̇? is the power supplied to the chiller. 
?̇? = ?̇? ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝑃          (2) 
I estimated the chiller COP as a function of the ambient air temperature for various LWTs, which 
is the temperature that the water leaves the chiller in degrees Celsius. The relationship between 
the COP and the ambient air temperature for a LWT of 10°C is estimated to be: 
𝐶𝑂𝑃 = 5.6091−0.0756 ∙ 𝑇𝑎𝑚𝑏       (3) 
This is representative of commercial air-cooled chiller products.6 
 I assume the water stored in the water tanks is stratified independent of the amount of 
time the water has been stored in the tanks. Thus, 10°C can be used for all chilled water 
calculations and 15.6°C for all warm water calculations.  
                                                 
6 This equation is based on performance data for air-cooled chillers from Daikin McQuay, a commercial 
HVAC company (Daikin McQuay, 2009). A linear association between the COP and ambient air 




Table 3-1: Summary of the Chilled Water Cooling and Thermal Energy Storage System 
Parameter Value 
Discharge time 6 hours 
Maximum volume of chilled water 9000 m3 
Chilled water discharge rate  25 m3/min 
Chiller cooling capacity 1924 kW 
Electrical input  628 – 835 kW 
Number of chillers 2 
Total capital cost $4.25 million  
Annual revenue requirement $466,067 
Notes: The overnight capital cost of the chilled water system in Ellis (2012) is $13 million. I 
estimated the capital cost of our chilled-water cooling system based on quotes for two 550-ton 
chillers and scaling linearly the capital cost of the chilled water system in Ellis (2012), with the 
storage tank and system to pump water into and out of the tank. Our system’s discharge is 24.5 
percent of the discharge rate in Ellis (2012) and our maximum storage volume of chilled water is 
27 percent of the maximum volume in Ellis (2012). Therefore, I assume that our capital costs for 
the storage tanks and the system to move water into and out of the tanks is approximately 25 
percent of the capital cost in Ellis (2012). The annual revenue requirement is based on a 7 percent 
weighted average cost of capital and a 20-year operating lifetime.  
 
3.2.2 Ambient Air Temperature and Power Production 
The maximum power production from air-cooled low-resource temperature geothermal 
power plants depends on the difference between the temperature of the geothermal reservoir and 
the ambient air temperature:  
𝜂 = 1 − 𝑇𝐴 𝑇𝐻⁄           (4) 
where 𝑇𝐻 is the absolute temperature of the geothermal resource and 𝑇𝐴 is the absolute ambient 
air temperature. A higher reservoir temperature relative to the ambient air temperature leads to a 
higher efficiency. Lowering the ambient air temperature by one degree has a more significant 
effect on overall efficiency than increasing the temperature of the geothermal resource by one 
degree. This suggests that hybrid-cooling methods for boosting the power production during 
periods with high ambient temperatures should be investigated for their technical and economic 
feasibility.  
𝜕𝜂 𝜕𝑇𝐴⁄ = − 1 𝑇𝐻⁄           (5) 
𝜕𝜂 𝜕𝑇𝐻⁄ = 𝑇𝐴 𝑇𝐻
2⁄           (6) 
𝜕𝜂 𝜕𝑇𝐻⁄ = (− 𝜕𝜂 𝜕𝑇𝐴⁄ )(𝑇𝐴 𝑇𝐻⁄ ) ,      𝑇𝐴 𝑇𝐻⁄  < 1 ⇒ 𝜕𝜂 𝜕𝑇𝐻⁄ < − 𝜕𝜂 𝜕𝑇𝐴⁄    (7) 
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Figure 3-3 below shows the relationship between the net power production of the CPG 
power plant and the ambient air temperature. Two sets of parameters were modeled. Both sets fix 
the injection and production well diameters at 0.41 m and 0.28 m respectively. The well depth is 
also fixed at 2.5 km. The two sets of parameters adjust the temperature gradient from the surface 
to the geothermal reservoir and the reservoir permeability. The first set of parameters fixes the 
temperature gradient at 35 degrees Celsius per km and the permeability at 5e-14 𝑚2. The second 
set of parameters fixes the temperature gradient at 20 degrees Celsius per km and the 
permeability at 1e-13 𝑚2. 
Figure 3-3: Relationship between Ambient Air Temperature and Net Power 
 
Notes: Net power production generated by the CPG plant is estimated using Engineering 
Equation Solver (EES) for the system outlined in the schematic of the power plant in subsection 
3.2.1.  
 
The two sets of parameters allow me to investigate the impact of the temperature gradient 
and the permeability of the heat resource on the operations of a CPG power plant with a chilled-
water cooling system added on. It is not clear a priori whether the chiller will be used more often 
and contribute more to operational revenue under either scenario. With a lower quality heat 
resource, the chilled-water cooling system would give more of a boost in net power production 
when the ambient air temperature is higher because the percentage change in the difference 
between the heat resource temperature and the cooling temperature is higher compared to the 
higher quality heat resource. However, a higher quality heat resource provides more power to 
chill water down to the LWT when electricity prices are low. Therefore, the higher quality heat 
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resource allows more water to be chilled down to the LWT during periods when prices are low 
compared to the lower quality heat resource. This suggests that the impact of the heat resource on 
the use of a chiller is uncertain, and the competing effects may cancel out. I investigated this by 
running our optimal scheduling model over both sets of parameters.  
 
3.2.3 Ambient Air Temperature and Electricity Prices 
I downloaded the hourly ambient air temperatures of three different locations 
(Shreveport, LA, Carlsbad, NM, and Mitchell, SD) from the National Weather Service. These 
locations were chosen because they were thought initially to offer interesting comparisons based 
on their different ambient air temperature profiles. The hourly ambient air temperatures are for 
the year 2010. The hourly day-ahead prices for electricity near Mitchell, SD and spot prices7 for 
electricity near Carlsbad, NM and Shreveport, LA were obtained from the archived data provided 
by the Midwest ISO and the Southwest Power Pool.  
The ambient air temperature is lowest at night and typically reaches a maximum in 
midafternoon. I expected initially that the price of electricity would be the highest when the 
ambient air temperature is highest and the CPG power production is the lowest. The loss of power 
production occurs when the ambient air temperature is high because of the relationship shown in 
equation 4. The data show a positive relationship between electricity prices and ambient air 
temperature during the hot summer months. However, there are temporal mismatches between 
time periods with the highest electricity prices and time periods with the highest ambient air 
temperatures since use also depends on time of day. For example, the daily maximum air 
temperature at the three locations frequently occurs outside the period of high electricity prices 
traditionally defined as 4:00 pm to 7:00 pm when people are coming home from work and 
adjusting the thermostat, turning on TVs, etc. This suggests that fewer arbitrage opportunities 
exist from producing chilled water when the ambient temperature is low and using the stored 
chilled water to cool the plant when ambient air temperature is high.  
  
3.2.4 Description of Mixed Discrete-Continuous Model Framework 
 I use historical hourly electricity prices and historical hourly temperature data to evaluate 
decisions about the use of the chilled-water cooling system. The decisions concern when to 
produce chilled water and when to use it to cool the geothermal plant to increase power 
                                                 
7 Carlsbad, NM and Shreveport, LA are located in the Southwest Power Pool, which only administers a 
spot market for electricity.  
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production. I also evaluate the incremental operating revenue from adding on the chilled-water 
cooling system and the payback period for the system.  
I use a discrete time, continuous state dynamic programming model to describe the 
economic problem facing the operator of the low-resource temperature geothermal power plant 
with a chiller. The state space is mixed and includes the discrete state variables, which are the 
market prices for electricity and the hourly ambient air temperatures, and a continuous state 
variable, which is the quantity of chilled water. The state space is mixed with discrete and 
continuous state variables 
𝑆 = {𝑄, 𝑃, 𝐶}          (8) 
where Q represents the quantity of chilled water in storage tanks on a continuous interval from 
zero to 9000 cubic meters, 𝑃 = {1 … 8760} represents the hourly electricity prices for the year 
2010, and 𝐶 = {1 … 8760} represents the hourly ambient air temperatures for the year 2010. The 
full state space can be described as the product 𝑄 × {𝐶𝑡, 𝑃𝑡}, 𝑡 = 1 … 𝑇. I refer to a specific state 
in the state space as (𝑞, 𝑐, 𝑝).  
The action space is represented by X and it includes all the actions that may be taken by 
the operator of the power plant. Specifically, the operator may 1) produce chilled water, 2) 
consume chilled water to cool the power plant while producing electricity for sale, or 3) produce 
electricity for sale into the market using the ambient air to cool the power plant.  
𝑋 = {𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑 , 𝑥𝑢𝑠𝑒 , 𝑥𝑎𝑖𝑟}         (9) 
The actions are constrained so that the quantity of chilled water does not exceed the 9000 
cubic meters capacity of the storage tanks and the operator does not use more chilled water than 
is in storage. The continuous state variable is a controlled Markov process so that the quantity of 
chilled water in time period 𝑡 + 1 depends on the quantity of chilled water in time period 𝑡 and 
the action taken in time period 𝑡: 
 𝑞𝑡+1 = 𝑔(𝑞𝑡, 𝑐𝑡 , 𝑝𝑡|𝑥𝑡)         (10) 
where 𝑔 is the equation of motion, which says that reaching 𝑞𝑡+1 is a function of the action 𝑥𝑡 
taken in state (𝑞𝑡, 𝑐𝑡 , 𝑝𝑡). In the model, the discrete states are exogenous parameters and transition 
independently of the action 𝑥𝑡 taken by the operator.  
The reward functions are defined for each action and pair of discrete states as 
𝑅𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑
𝑐,𝑝
= 0          (11) 
𝑅𝑥𝑢𝑠𝑒
𝑐,𝑝
= (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝐿𝑊𝑇)𝑝        (12) 
where 𝛼𝑖 is the intercept, 𝛽𝑖 is the slope (𝑖 = 1, 2), 𝐿𝑊𝑇 is the leaving water temperature, and i 
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indexes the quality of the heat resource.8  The reward for producing with ambient air is: 
𝑅𝑥𝑎𝑖𝑟
𝑐,𝑝
= (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑐𝑖)𝑝         (13) 
where 𝑐𝑖 is the ambient air temperature in degrees Celsius at time t. I set the temperature of the 
chilled water leaving the storage tanks to 10 degrees Celsius and the temperature of the chilled 
water returning to the storage tanks after passing through the power plant condenser to 15.6 
degrees Celsius. I also require that the temperature of the chilled water that enters the chiller is 
15.6 degrees Celsius and that it is supplied to the storage tanks at 10 degrees Celsius.  
 The Bellman equation is: 
𝑉𝑡(𝑞, 𝑐, 𝑝) =
max
𝑥 ∈ 𝑋(𝑞, 𝑐, 𝑝){𝑅𝑥
𝑐,𝑝(𝑞) + 𝑉𝑡+1(𝑔(𝑞, 𝑐, 𝑝, 𝑥))}, 𝑞, 𝑐, 𝑝 ∈ 𝑆, 𝑡 = 1,2, … 𝑇  (14) 
Where 𝑉𝑡(𝑞, 𝑐, 𝑝) represents the maximum attainable sum of current and expected future rewards 
given that the economic process is in state s in time period t. The Bellman equation captures the 
economic problem facing the plant operator. The plant operator balances the immediate reward 
𝑅𝑥
𝑐,𝑝(𝑞) against the future rewards 𝑉𝑡+1(𝑔(𝑞, 𝑐, 𝑝, 𝑥)).  
The model is a finite time horizon model. The operator faces decisions in time periods 
1 … 𝑇 and 𝑉𝑇+1(𝑞𝑇+1, 𝑐𝑇+1, 𝑝𝑇+1) is set equal to zero because there are no rewards beyond the 
terminal decision period.  
 
3.2.5 Model Solution 
 Equation (11) gives the mechanism for using backward recursion to solve the 
optimization problem. The terminal point is free, so I use a backward recursive process to solve 
beginning at the terminal point plus one additional time period.  
𝑉𝑇
∗(𝑞𝑇 , 𝑐𝑇 , 𝑝𝑇) =
max
𝑥𝑇 ∈ 𝑋(𝑞𝑇 , 𝑐𝑇 , 𝑝𝑇)
{𝑅𝑥
𝑐,𝑝(𝑞𝑇) + 𝑉𝑇+1(𝑔(𝑞𝑇+1, 𝑐𝑇+1, 𝑝𝑇+1, 𝑥𝑇+1))}  (15) 
The optimal policy 𝜋𝑇 and 𝑉𝑇
∗(𝑞𝑇 , 𝑐𝑇 , 𝑝𝑇) are obtained. Then I compute 𝑉𝑇−1
∗ (𝑞𝑇−1, 𝑐𝑇−1, 𝑝𝑇−1) 
from 
𝑉𝑇−1
∗ (𝑞𝑇−1, 𝑐𝑇−1, 𝑝𝑇−1)    
=
max
𝑥𝑇−1 ∈ 𝑋(𝑞𝑇−1, 𝑐𝑇−1, 𝑝𝑇−1)
{𝑅𝑥
𝑐,𝑝(𝑞𝑇−1) + 𝑉𝑇(𝑔(𝑞𝑇 , 𝑐𝑇 , 𝑝𝑇 , 𝑥𝑇))}   (16) 
This process is continued until I have solved recursively backward for 
𝑉𝑇−1
∗ (𝑞𝑇−1, 𝑐𝑇−1, 𝑝𝑇−1) for 𝑖 = 0 … 𝑇.  
I begin by constructing a discrete space on the continuous state space using Chebychev 
                                                 
8 The intercept and slope coefficients for the 35C/km, 5e-14Res and 20C/km, 1e-13Res heat resources are 
estimated by fitting a linear relationship to data showing the association between power generated (MW) 
and the ambient air temperature. The data were generated using the EES to estimate net power production 
for the system outlined in the schematic of the power plant in subsection 3.2.1. 
50 
 
nodes. Let ?̅? represent the discrete space. The optimal value and optimal action are evaluated at 
the Chebychev nodes during each iteration in ?̅?  × {𝐶𝑡, 𝑃𝑡}. Then I set up interpolation functions 
to cover all the points in the state space ?̅?  × {𝐶𝑡 , 𝑃𝑡}, 𝑡 = 1 … 𝑇.   
The following algorithm describes the iterative process used to interpolate over the state 
space.  
Set optimal value in time period 𝑇 + 1 equal to zero at each Chebychev node 
Compute the basis functions and the coefficient matrix for time period 𝑇 + 1  
with the constraint Φ(𝑐) = 0 where 𝜙 is a row vector of basis 
functions in the matrix Φ and is evaluated at a Chebychev node s and c 
is the coefficient vector 
For each Chebychev node 
Evaluate the current rewards in time period T for each action 
Compute the state transitions for each action 
Compute the basis functions for the next state reached in time period T+1 for each action 
Φ(𝑐) where 𝜙 is evaluated at the next state is the expected future value in time period 
𝑇 + 1 
Sum the current reward and the expected future value for each action 
Select the optimal action, which maximizes the sum of current and expected future 
rewards 
Set the maximum sum equal to the optimal value of being at the Chebychev node in time 
period T and selecting the optimal action 
Repeat the process by evaluating the basis functions at each Chebychev node and 
computing the coefficient vector with the constraint that Φ(𝑐) = 𝑉 where 𝑉 is the 
vector of optimal values in time period T at each Chebychev node 
Continue the process until a coefficient vector is computed for each time period 𝑡 =
1 … 𝑇 + 1. 
 
After I have computed coefficient vectors for each time period 𝑡 = 1 … 𝑇 + 1, I run 
simulations of the state path and optimal policy. The following algorithm describes the simulation 
process.  
Set the initial state in time period 1 
Compute the current reward for each action 
Compute the state transitions for each action 
Evaluate Φ at the next state in time period 2 for each action 
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Compute Φ(𝑐) for each action 
Φ(𝑐) evaluated at the next state is the expected future reward of being in the next state in 
time period 2 
Sum the current and expected future rewards for each action 
Select the maximum sum – this corresponds to the optimal action given the initial state 
Find the next state – this is the state in time period 2 
Repeat the process for time periods 𝑡 = 1 … 𝑇 
Output a vector of states and a vector of optimal actions for each time period 
Periods 𝑡 = 1 … 𝑇 
 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Forecasting in the model 
 I estimated the annual value of chilled-water cooling system attached to a low-resource 
temperature geothermal power plant at three different locations: (1) Mitchell, SD, (2) Carlsbad, 
NM, and (3) Shreveport, LA. Carlsbad and Shreveport are located in the Southwest Power Pool. 
The operation of the chilled-water cooling system was optimized to maximize expected operating 
profits over a one-year time horizon. The optimization was conducted assuming perfect foresight 
of future hourly electricity prices and ambient air temperatures during the year 2010. I also 
assume that the operator is a price-taker. Sioshansi et al. (2009) find that the assumption of 
perfect foresight of electricity prices is convenient and produces qualitatively similar results 
compared to a naïve forecast. This assumption puts an upper bound on the operating revenue 
attainable from using a chilled-water cooling system. Sioshansi et al. (2009) estimated a naïve 
approach to forecasting, where next week’s hourly electricity prices were forecasted to be the 
same as last week’s hourly electricity prices, and found that it captures 85 percent of the upper 
bound on operating revenue.  
 
3.3.2 Efficiency gains 
The simulated power gains from use of the chilled water are negative during the winter 
months and parts of the spring and fall when the ambient air temperature is below the temperature 
of the chilled water. Power gains increase during the summer months and are the highest during 
the hottest months of the year. The maximum gain in power at all three locations is about 1.65 
MW. The linear relationship between power output (MW) and the ambient air temperature is 
truncated at zero power output. In all three locations, hourly ambient air temperatures exceeded 




3.3.3 Production of Chilled Water under Different Price and Temperature Conditions 
 The model runs used hourly temperatures and electricity prices for the year 2010, which 
represents perfect forecasts of ambient air temperatures and electricity prices as previously 
mentioned. Therefore, the results of the model runs represent an upper bound. In the base case, 
the chiller is never used during the year at all three locations for both the higher and lower quality 
resources. This result was unexpected, and therefore led me to investigate the conditions needed 
for making the use of the chiller economical. The results below are generated using the higher 
quality heat resource at the Mitchell, SD location. I fit electricity prices from July 1, 2010 to July 
7, 2010 at Mitchell, SD to a Fourier series model with two cosine and two sine terms. Then I 
adjusted the cyclical amplitude by factors of two, three, four, five, six, and seven, and ran the 
model each time with the adjusted prices. The figure below shows that the production of chilled 
water by factors of upward adjustment in the cyclical amplitude of electricity prices. Our results 
also suggest that the system approaches a limit on the use and production of chilled water as I 
continue to increase the cyclical amplitude. This is due to the economics of these operational 
decisions being also dependent on changes in the ambient air temperature.  
 
Figure 3-4: Production of Chilled Water with Upward Adjustments in the Cyclical 
Amplitude of Electricity Prices 
 
Notes: The cyclical amplitude of prices was adjusted up by factors of one to seven for the period 
from July 1, 2010 to July 7, 2020. For each factor, the algorithm was run to optimize the 




 A similar analysis was conducted to investigate the impact of changes in the ambient air 
temperature on the operation of the chilled-water cooling system. A Fourier Series model with 
two cosine terms and two sine terms was fit to one-week intervals in the electricity price and 
ambient air temperature and phase differences were calculated for each day in units of time. I 
calculated phase differences up to seven hours. However, for most of the days the phase 
difference was found to be in the range of two to four hours. Therefore, I introduced phase 
difference of zero, one, two, and three hours between the ambient air temperature and the 
electricity prices, holding the phase difference constant over the same one-week period described 
above. I ran the model for each level of phase difference and calculated the production of chilled 
water over the one-week period. For each level of phase difference, the model was run over the 
seven different cyclical amplitudes in electricity prices described above. Figure 3-5 below shows 
the results of this analysis. The phase difference has a significant impact on the production of 
chilled water. A three-hour difference in phase results in about a 20-45 percent decrease in the 
production of chilled water depending on the cyclical amplitude in electricity prices. As I 
mentioned previously, a phase difference of three hours is not unlikely given that the peak 
electricity price is around 6 pm and the ambient air temperature often peaks in the mid-afternoon.  
 
Figure 3-5: Impact of a Phase Difference between Electricity Prices and Ambient Air 
Temperature 
 
Notes: This figure shows the impact of the interaction between the phase lag and price spread on 
the production of chilled water for a one-week period. There are seven different price spreads and 
four different phase lags. The production of chilled water for a one-week period was computed 




It should also be noted that even if there is no phase difference between electricity prices 
and the ambient air temperature, the chiller-water cooling system is not used unless I adjust 
upward the cyclical amplitude in electricity prices. This suggests that the price spreads are not 
high enough to make using the chilled-water cooling system economical even when there is no 
difference in phase between prices and ambient air temperatures.  
A second analysis was conducted by varying the cyclical amplitude of changes in 
ambient air temperature. Increasing the cyclical amplitude of changes in ambient air temperature 
had no effect on operations. There was no production of chilled water even when the cyclical 
amplitude was adjusted up by a factor of 15. This result is not surprising considering that 
increasing the spread increases opportunity costs and as well as arbitrage opportunities. That is, 
more power output can be achieved when the ambient air temperature is low. Therefore, the 
opportunity cost of not selling the power increases. However, more chilled water can be produced 
and a larger percentage increase in power output can be achieved when the ambient air 
temperature is higher. Both effects seem to cancel each other out.  
 
3.4. Discussion 
3.4.1 Conditions for the use of the chilled-water cooling system 
I have simulated the operation of a low-temperature resource geothermal power plant 
with a chilled-water cooling and storage system. Previous research has explored the use of water 
augmented cooling systems in low-temperature geothermal power plants to conserve water and 
boost power production during the summer peak period (Sohel et al., 2009; Ashwood and 
Bharathan, 2011). The chilled-water cooling system proposed here is closed-loop and could be 
operated even when the plant does not have a supply of water. However, the key difference 
between our system and other water-augmented cooling methods is that the chilled-water cooling 
system also serves as a thermal energy storage technology. Therefore, its use and economic 
feasibility depend on different factors from the traditional water augmented systems that have 
been studied in the literature.  
The chilled-water cooling system requires electricity to produce chilled water. Therefore, 
the use of chilled water depends not just on the additional operating revenue from power gains 
during the summer peak period, but on the arbitrage value between the production and use 
periods. The additional operating revenue from using chilled water during the summer peak 
periods must outweigh the opportunity cost of foregoing the sale of power during the period of 
chilled-water production.  
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For the selected weeks in April and July, I showed that the relationship between 
electricity prices and the ambient air temperature changes day-to-day. This suggests that inter-day 
arbitrage opportunities are not always present despite the diurnal pattern in electricity prices. 
Arbitrage opportunities for a low-temperature geothermal power plant with a thermal energy 
storage system depend on a strong positive relationship between ambient air temperatures and 
prices for lowering the opportunity cost of chilling water on a per-unit basis and boosting the 
power production and operating revenues in time periods when the chilled water is used to cool 
the power plant. Figure 3-6 below shows that electricity prices and the ambient air temperature 
are out of phase. The phase difference is not constant.  
Figure 3-6: Electricity Prices and Ambient Air Temperatures 
 
Notes: Fourier series models with two cosine and two sine terms were used to curve-fit one week 
of data from July 1, 2010 to July 7, 2010 at Mitchell, SD.  
 
3.4.2 Comparison to other energy storage technologies 
I define an energy storage technology broadly as any device that is capable of time-
shifting electricity (allowing it to be produced at one time and consumed at another time). I noted 
previously that the low-temperature geothermal plant with a chilled-water cooling system is a 
type of thermal energy storage system – energy is used to chill water, which is stored in tanks for 
later use to boost power production during time periods with a high ambient air temperature. In 
comparison to other energy storage technologies on the supply-side, the round- trip efficiency of 
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our thermal energy storage system (defined as the boost in power production from cooling the 
power plant with chilled water divided by the energy consumed to produce the chilled-water) is 
also low. Estimating the round-trip efficiency of the chilled-water cooling system is difficult 
because the efficiency factor depends on the ambient air temperatures during the production and 
use periods. I estimate a range for the round-trip efficiency between 25 – 45 percent based on the 
simulated production of chilled water and use of chilled water in later periods. Other established 
grid-scale storage systems such as compressed-air energy storage (CAES) and pumped 
hydroelectric energy storage (PHES) achieve round-trip efficiencies of 70 percent and 78 percent 
respectively (Schoenung and Hassenzahl, 2003).  
 Energy storage devices with higher round-trip efficiencies are better able to take 
advantage of the arbitrage opportunities in the wholesale markets for electricity. The low round 
trip efficiencies achieved by our system means that a bigger price spread is needed between low-
cost energy and high-cost energy to obtain positive economic returns.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
The results presented in this paper suggest that adding a chilled-water cooling system to a 
low-temperature geothermal power plant would not be a cost-effective method for boosting 
overall efficiency when the ambient air temperature is high. The cooling system is essentially a 
thermal energy storage system and allows the plant operator to time-shift the supply of electricity. 
However, there is not always a positive relationship between prices and ambient air temperatures. 
I showed that the chilled-water cooling system does boost the overall efficiency of the power 
system when prices are high, but the arbitrage value is low primarily because of two factors: the 
inefficiency of the energy storage system and a mismatch between periods of high energy prices 
and high temperatures.  
The thermal energy storage system is inefficient from a thermodynamic perspective. 
Therefore, large price and temperature changes are needed to yield positive economic returns. In 
all of the model runs, the chiller was never used. This brings into question the conditions under 
which our system would produce positive economic returns. I used a Fourier series model to 
curve fit electricity prices for a one-week period at Mitchell, SD with the goal of simply 
distinguishing between low-price and high price periods and artificially setting a price spread. 
Several model runs were performed for different cyclical amplitudes and for each model run I 
plotted the production and use of chilled water. Using this method, I was able to estimate that 
price spreads between low-price and high-price periods need to be increased significantly for the 
chiller to produce positive economic returns given the changes in ambient air temperatures.  
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Price spreads need to be increased by orders of magnitude in order for the arbitrage value 
to outweigh opportunity cost and to justify operating the chiller in real-time electricity markets on 
an economic basis. Future study could investigate whether similar price-temperature profiles to 
the conditions studied in this paper can be found and then explore whether operation of a low-
temperature geothermal power plant with chiller is economically viable. Moreover, the increased 
volatility in real-time markets leads me to conclude that continuous discharge times would be 
shorter compared to day-ahead markets. Further study would need to be done to determine ramp 
rates and flexibility of the system described to be dispatched in real-time in the up and down 
directions. Shorter discharge times also reduce the amount of storage needed to exploit arbitrage 
opportunities, and this would reduce the annual revenue requirement of the system possibly 
making it economical to add on to an existing low-temperature geothermal power plant.  
Second, and perhaps more important, there is a mismatch between the highest 
temperatures and the highest electricity prices. I showed that higher prices generally correlate 
with higher temperatures. However, the highest temperatures do not always occur when 
electricity prices are highest because the highest electricity prices depend strongly on the time of 
day (e.g., when people arrive home from their daily work). This mismatch significantly reduces 
the arbitrage opportunities for any thermal energy storage device such as the chilled-water 
cooling system proposed in this paper.  
Although the chilled-water cooling system was not found to be cost effective, there may 
exist market conditions and institutions in the future that would make such a system economical. 
The nation is moving to a smart grid and dynamic pricing programs using real-time prices offer 
the opportunity to utilize a chilled-water cooling to increase the value of low-temperature 
geothermal. Perhaps more important, geothermal does not have to be thought of as just base load 
generation. Opportunities may exist, depending on the price-temperature profile, to utilize 
geothermal generation to match supply and demand by producing power during high demand 




4. Chapter 3 - Why Market Rules Matter: Optimizing Pumped Hydroelectric Storage 
When Compensation Rules Differ 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Energy storage could play an important role in the future United States electric system. 
Numerous federal and state policies have been implemented to stimulate development of low-
carbon and renewable technologies. These policies include the wind production tax credit (PTC), 
a federal tax credit for solar as part of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, and 
many state Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPSs) (DSIRE 2014). With over 60,000 MW of 
installed wind power and 3,500 MW of PV solar, these policies have been successful, but 
managing the variability of wind and solar resources requires new approaches to operate the 
electric grid and makes storage a critical technology. 
Natural variability of electricity flows from wind or solar plants can create grid 
instabilities that can negatively affect the electrical system’s ability to reliably provide electricity 
when it is needed (Katzenstein and Apt, 2012). In addition, when conventional sources of 
electricity (e. g., coal or nuclear power plants) cannot be ramped up or down sufficiently to 
balance variability in wind or solar–generated electricity, wind turbines may have to be curtailed 
to prevent transmission line congestion and to maintain system balance. One solution to help with 
grid integration of renewable energy is to store electricity as it is generated (Hall, 2008). Energy 
storage technologies can help to integrate higher penetrations of low-carbon renewable energy 
into the electric system and a number of utility-scale energy storage technologies are being 
developed, including compressed air energy storage, electrochemical batteries and capacitors, and 
flywheel energy storage (Carnegie et al., 2013).  
The need for utility-scale energy storage is also motivating new policy discussions to 
stimulate development of energy storage technologies—such as the procurement target of 1,325 
MW of energy storage by 2020 set by the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC press 
release, 2013)—and investigations of the reliable energy storage technologies with fast response 
times ("ramp rates") that can allow electrical grid operators to better accommodate large amounts 
of electricity generated from variable sources (CAISO Strategic Plan, 2013). Fast ramp rates 
allow electrical grid operators to accommodate large amounts of electricity generated from 
variable sources. 
Among the bulk energy storage options, Pumped Hydroelectric Energy Storage (PHES) 
is the most widely deployed utility-scale energy storage technology (Foley et al., 2013), with over 
127,000 MW of capacity installed globally and 40 projects totaling 22,000 MW in the United 
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States alone (EIA, 2012; Castelvecchi, 2012; The Economist, 2012). With PHES, water is stored 
in an upper water reservoir which is situated at a higher elevation than a lower water reservoir. 
Energy is stored by pumping water from the lower reservoir into the upper reservoir. The amount 
of energy that can be stored depends on the elevation difference between the reservoirs, or the 
“head height,” and the total volume of water that can be moved between the reservoirs. When 
water flows from the upper to the lower reservoir, it flows through a pump-turbine that generates 
electricity. The ability to store energy and generate electricity when desired creates a number of 
opportunities for project developers. 
In many parts of the United States, the value of PHES plants will be determined by the 
revenue the facility could earn in regional energy markets. ISOs manage about 70 percent of the 
wholesale electric power flows and operate energy markets (EIA, 2011). ISOs use a locational 
marginal pricing (LMP) approach to calculate electricity prices at different market nodes, so the 
value of a PHES would partially be determined by its location. Historically, prices have generally 
followed a diurnal pattern; prices are low during off-peak demand periods and higher during peak 
demand periods. These pricing dynamics create arbitrage opportunities for energy storage 
because a PHES operator can pump water from the lower reservoir and energy can be stored 
when prices are low and release water from the upper reservoir to generate electricity when prices 
are high.  
In addition to calculating LMPs, ISOs have also established markets for grid stability 
services, such as frequency regulation or spinning reserves. Frequency regulation involves the 
commitment of capacity to ramp up or down according to a set of instruction from the RTO for 
the purpose of matching supply and demand on a second-by-second basis in order to maintain 
power quality. The substantial improvement in the pump-turbine technology used in PHES 
systems can also allow newer PHES turbine technologies to provide regulation services in both 
pumping and generating modes. So, for PHES facilities located in ISO electricity markets, PHES 
facility operators can generate revenues both by exploiting arbitrage opportunities and by selling 
regulation services.  
The value of an energy storage project will thus depend on (1) how the electricity market 
functions; (2) how storage is valued for the sale of electricity; and (3) its ability to provide and 
earn money from regulation services. But while U.S. electricity markets follow standard market 
design, the value of an energy storage project depends on the very specific details of how each 
ISO's market rules compensate energy storage (Hogan, 2002). There are nine different ISOs in 
the United States—each of which determines its own rules for compensation in consultation with 
members and approvals by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). 
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PHES facility profits are partly determined by the stream of revenues, which depend on 
the future prices in electricity and regulation service markets, the ISO rules governing those 
markets, and the operational strategies used by the facility operator. Here, I examine and compare 
how the rules and markets of the Midcontinent ISO (MISO) and ISO New England (ISO-NE) 
would affect the optimal strategies employed by PHES operators and thus the total value of 
providing energy storage. These ISOs were chosen because, until 2011, they had different rules 
for compensation. In MISO, compensation for frequency regulation only included payments for 
capacity set aside and payments (charges) for net energy injected into (withdrawn from) the 
power system. ISO-NE makes capacity payments and “mileage” payments based on the absolute 
amount of energy injected and withdrawn. The mileage payment is intended to reward the 
quantity and accuracy of frequency regulation service provided by the participant and is 
explained in more detail below in Section 4.2.1.1.  
In October 2011, FERC issued Order No. 755 mandating that all ISOs develop a 
compensation method that provides both a capacity payment and a mileage payment to reward 
resources with faster ramp rates. I estimate the net profits of a PHES facility under the MISO 
rules and ISO-New England market rules at the time Order No. 755 was issued to better assess 
how the rule affects strategy and compensation of storage projects. I estimate the difference in net 
profits and bidding activity under the different compensation formulas in place prior to the FERC 
mandate to gain insight into the level of impact that Order No. 755 has on the development and 
deployment of resources with faster-ramp speeds and to highlight the importance of ISO rules on 
operator value. In 2012 MISO changed is compensation formula to comply with Order No. 755 
(FERC 2012). 
The model and analysis focus on the perspective of a PHES facility operator, and not on 
the total system costs examined by other studies (Foley, 2013). Previous work has also 
investigated optimal bidding strategies for PHES facility operators, including approaches that fix 
the efficiency factor and power generation bid (Lu et al., 2004), model participation in the energy 
and spinning reserve markets (Kanakasabapathy and Swarup, 2010), and restrict pumping and 
generation modes to the traditional off-peak and peak periods, respectively, but do not model 
participation in ancillary services markets (Deb, 2000; Connolly et al., 2011). Kazempour et al. 
(2009) presents a detailed model that considers uncertainty in price forecasts and allows the 
PHES plant to participate in the energy, spinning reserve, and frequency regulation services 
markets, but this approach restricts the flexibility of PHES to set aside different amounts of 
frequency reserve and fixes the efficiency factor of the plant and of the power generation bid. 
Algorithms that have been employed require the PHES plant to pump before it generates 
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(Kanakasabapathy and Swarup, 2010), allow pumping to occur either before or after generation 
(Connolly et al., 2011), or are simple heuristics for dispatch that maximize potential revenues 
from energy and frequency regulation services for each hour (Deb, 2000).  
The model determines the profit-maximizing behavior of a PHES facility and estimates 
revenue streams from selling both electricity and grid reliability services into different 
competitive wholesale electricity markets with different compensation mechanisms. The model 
also integrates detailed operational and physical specifications (BARR Engineering, 2009) that 
have previously received scant attention but are crucial for modeling system performance. 
Operationally, the PHES operator can choose to set aside capacity as frequency regulation 
reserve. Physically, the model accommodates how pump-turbine efficiencies vary according to 
head height and flow volume in both pumping and generating modes. Combined, upper and lower 
bounds are set to provide frequency regulation based on the relationships between head height, 
flow, and turbine efficiency. Our application determines optimal market bidding strategies for 
electricity and reliability services that operate under both the MISO and ISO-NE market rules. By 
comparing the value of PHES systems and the impacts of these different rules on revenue 
streams, a better understanding of the value of different policies and how they monetize the 
benefits provided by PHES can be achieved. 
Section 2 presents a brief discussion of the day-ahead and real-time electricity markets 
and the market for frequency regulation. This section also presents the optimization model. In 
Section 3, I present the results of the model. Section 4 presents a discussion of the value of PHES 
in the MISO and ISO-NE.  
 
4.2 Materials and Methods 
The following section details the real time markets and reliability service markets and 
provides a description of the model.  
 
4.2.1 Market Structure 
4.2.1.1 Day-Ahead and Real-Time Markets 
The wholesale market for electricity is co-optimized with ancillary services markets to 
solve for prices for electricity and ancillary services at LMP nodes. The electricity markets 
include a day-ahead market and a real-time market. The day-ahead market is a forward market, 
operated as an auction, where electric facilities submit hourly price-quantity electricity supply 
curves for the next operating day based on their estimates of demand. The ISO clears the day-
ahead market while ensuring that the solution is physically feasible. This clearing process 
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determines which bids are accepted and settles the accepted offers. Hourly LMPs are calculated 
and a set of hourly schedules is produced for the next operating day. 
The real-time market functions to match electricity generation with electricity demand 
because the quantity delivered may differ from the contracted quantity from the previous day in 
the day-ahead market. Hourly supply and demand for electricity can change for many reasons, 
including transmission and generation outages/failures and unexpected weather conditions.  
Supply offers (𝑄𝐷𝐴) are cleared in the day-ahead market and are paid the day-ahead price 
(𝑃𝐷𝐴). The difference between the physical production of electricity (𝑄𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑) and the quantity 
cleared in the day-ahead market is compensated at the hourly real-time weighted price (PRT). This 
real-time weighted price results from settling the market on a five-minute basis and bundling 
together twelve five-minute intervals. If a facility supplies less than the contracted quantity of 
electricity (QDA), it must purchase electricity on the real-time market to satisfy the contract. Net 
revenues are: 
𝑃𝐷𝐴𝑄𝐷𝐴 − 𝑃𝑅𝑇(𝑄𝐷𝐴−𝑄𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑).      (1) 
  
The wholesale markets for electricity in the ISO determine 𝑃𝑅𝑇 and 𝑃𝐷𝐴 for each 
particular location or node or LMP, which is the price and value of producing electricity at that 
particular location and time. Prices at each location reflect the marginal cost of electricity 
generation at a commercial pricing node plus transmission line losses and costs of transmission 
congestion. The real-time market settles the difference between scheduled transactions and actual 
transactions. Real-time market prices are more volatile than day-ahead prices because mismatches 
between supply and demand, perhaps due to outages and intermittent generators, are not perfectly 
predictable and these shortfalls and oversupplies must be resolved in the real-time market. While 
the PHES operator may negotiate a bilateral contract to reduce price risk, the model does not 
incorporate them because the primarily interest is in finding the arbitrage value of energy storage 
and the value of reliability services under different market rules.  
4.2.1.2 Reliability Service Markets 
ISOs are responsible for maintaining the stability of the electricity transmission grid and 
must comply with National Electricity Reliability Council (NERC) requirements. ISOs have also 
created and administer electricity and ancillary services markets under FERC authority with the 
goal of increasing efficiency and reducing costs. For example, the MISO and ISO-NE both have 
markets for reliability service products, including a market for the highest valued reliability 
service: frequency regulation. Frequency regulation is used to balance supply and demand for 
electricity on a second-by-second basis. When supply exceeds (is less than) demand, the 
63 
 
frequency will be too high (low). Area Control Error (ACE) indicates how much supply and 
demand are out of balance and in which direction the system needs to be corrected. ISOs monitor 
the frequency of the power system in real time using the ACE and send control signals to 
generators in the frequency regulation market that instruct these generators to ramp up or down. 
These generators comprise the “frequency regulation reserve.” 
PHES is an ideal technology to provide frequency regulation because it can quickly ramp 
up or down in generating mode by adjusting the flow of water through the wicket gates. A typical 
PHES facility can ramp from shutdown to full power in less than two minutes (Black and Veatch, 
2012); PHES also has a large load change capability in terms of it being a large-scale storage 
device. In comparison, new Combined-Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) power plants can be ramped 
about 10% of the rated capacity per minute (GE, 2011).  
Resources participating in the ISO day-ahead frequency regulation market must be able 
to supply regulation services in either the up or down direction within the five minute maximum 
allowable frequency regulation response time. The resource must also be able to supply frequency 
regulation continuously for one hour. Furthermore, the resource must also be able to receive and 
respond to Automatic Generation Control (AGC) signals, sent by the system operator every four 
seconds increase or decrease power injections accordingly to balance supply and demand. The 
faster a resource can ramp up or down, the more accurately it can respond to AGC.   
Prior to Order No. 755, compensation in MISO’s frequency regulation market included 
payments for capacity set aside to provide frequency regulation, which included payments for the 
opportunity cost of providing frequency regulation. Payments were made for the net power the 
resource injects into the system. For example, suppose a generator sells 200 MW into the day-
ahead electricity market and sets aside 20 MW for the regulation reserve market. Assume the 
average power output is 200 MW with regulation between 180 MW and 220 MW. If the 
generator is dispatched down, it must reduce output from 200 MW to 180 MW. Alternatively, if 
the generator is dispatched up, it must increase output to 220 MW. If the generator receives 
instructions to dispatch up and down for equal lengths of time in a given day, the average 
production will be 200 MW and it will receive the day-ahead locational LMP for the 200 MW 
sold into the day-ahead energy market (PDA). The generator also receives the market-clearing 
price for frequency regulation for the 20 MW offered into the regulation services market. If the 
generator is dispatched up more than it is dispatched down, the average production will be higher 
than 200 MW and it will also receive the real-time LMP (PRT) for the overage.  
MISO rules for frequency compensation conformed to the ISO standard. These rules 
applied the same compensation formula—calculated on a per-MW basis for setting aside 
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capacity—to all resources that are cleared in the frequency regulation market. These rules did not 
compensate faster ramping resources, which are capable of providing more, and more accurate, 
ACE correction (see FERC, 2011). In contrast, ISO-NE designed its compensation formula to 
incorporate the additional value that faster ramping provides in terms of both the quantity and 
accuracy of ACE correction.  
ISO-NE compensation has three components:  (1) Regulation Capacity Payment, (2) 
Regulation Service Payment (“mileage” payment), and (3) Regulation Opportunity Costs. Like 
MISO, the ISO-NE capacity payment compensates power plants for setting aside regulation 
reserve capacity to provide regulation service. The mileage payment compensates power plants 
for movements in response to ACE instructions; this payment is based on the sum of the absolute 
values of the provision of regulation service in the up and down directions. The mileage payment 
incentivizes faster-ramping resources and accurate responses to ACE instructions. The 
opportunity cost payment rewards power plants for the loss in electricity revenues and is included 
in the payment for regulation capacity. The figure below illustrates how this payment is 
calculated in the ISO-NE territory.  
Figure 4-1: Opportunity Cost for a Power Plant in ISO-NE Territory 
 
Notes: D1 is the economic dispatch point, where the plant can provide maximum output at the 
prevailing LMP, and D2 is the point where the power plant operates while providing regulation 
services. AVG is the average cost of a MW between the economic dispatch point (B1) and the 
point of operation while providing regulation services. The opportunity cost is |LMP – AVG|*(D1 














4.2.2 Description of Models 
I use a discrete state dynamic programming model to investigate the optimal dispatch of 
PHES in the markets from the perspective of an independent PHES operator. I assume that the 
PHES operator is a price-taker and sells electricity and frequency regulation services into the 
competitive markets. The day-ahead and real-time prices for electricity and the market clearing 
prices for frequency regulation are exogenous to the model and assumed to be known with 
certainty. The PHES operator chooses how to participate in the day-ahead electricity and 
frequency regulation markets with the objective of maximizing operating profit, and market rules 
for MISO and ISO-NE are imposed to assess their impact on the optimal dispatch decisions and 
financial returns to the PHES operator. I generate a vector of AGC instructions by simulating a 
random process for the ACE. For the purpose of our optimization model, I assume the future 
instructions from the ISO to ramp up or ramp down are known with certainty.  
 
4.2.2.1 Discrete Time and Discrete State Dynamic Programming Model 
The operator seeks to maximize the sum of current and expected future rewards. In this 
sequential decision problem, the transitions from one state to another state are governed by a state 
transition function and the set of actions and rewards depends on the current state and time 
period. With a one-week time horizon and sequential decisions made hourly, the Bellman 
equation is: 
𝑉𝑡(𝑠𝑡) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑥𝜖𝑋{𝑓(𝑠𝑡, 𝑥𝑡) + 𝑉𝑡+1(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑥𝑡)}     (2) 
where 𝑉𝑡(𝑠𝑡) is the maximum sum of the current and future rewards when the system is in state s 
in time period t. The control variable is x, 𝑓(𝑠𝑡, 𝑥𝑡) is the current reward, and 𝑉(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑥𝑡) is the 
maximized future reward given the state 𝑠𝑡+1.  
The dynamic programming model has the following structure:  in every period t, the 
operator observes an economic state 𝑠𝑡, takes an action 𝑥𝑡, and earns a reward 𝑓(𝑠𝑡, 𝑥𝑡) that 
depends on the current state and on the action. The state variables are: (1) head height (h), defined 
as the difference between the Upper Water Surface Elevation (UWSE) and the Lower Water 
Surface Elevation (LWSE); (2) prices in the competitive day-ahead (PDA) and real-time (PRT) 
electricity markets; and (3) prices in the day-ahead market for frequency regulation services (Pr). 
The head height reflects the amount of energy that is stored in the upper reservoir and thus the 
amount of power that can be generated from releasing water from the upper reservoir to the lower 
reservoir. For discrete head heights between upper and lower bounds (hmin and hmax), which are 
the constraints on the total volume of water that can be displaced, the set of possible states s at 
time t is: 
66 
 
𝑠𝑡 = {ℎ𝑚𝑖𝑛 , … , ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥; 𝑃𝐷𝐴,𝑡 , 𝑃𝑅𝑇,𝑡 , 𝑃𝑟,𝑡}.       (3) 
If a PHES operator chooses to not participate in the market for regulation services, this 
operator completely controls the flow of water between the two reservoirs. In this case, the choice 
variable is the volume of water flowing through the wicket gates, with a positive flow 
corresponding to electricity generation and a negative flow corresponding to the energy required 
to pump water from the lower reservoir to the upper reservoir. The system is idle when the flow is 
zero. With this restricted set of controls, an operator could earn revenues by exploiting arbitrage 
opportunities that arise from diurnal variations in electricity prices. But if an operator chooses to 
participate in the market for regulation services, this operator relinquishes partial control to the 
ISO. The PHES operator’s decision is thus how much regulation service to provide. I include this 
expanded set of control options in the model. 
In the absence of pump-turbine efficiency considerations and mechanical limitations, a 
PHES facility could set aside half of its maximum output as frequency regulation reserve and be 
in compliance with the requirement that ramping must be possible in both the up and down 
directions within the five-minute maximum allowable response time. I add realism in the model 
by constructing a more restrictive operating envelope that takes into account pump-turbine 
efficiency and mechanical issues based on PHES facility specifications and turbine parameters in 
BARR Engineering Company’s Giants Ridge project (BARR Engineering, 2009). The 
combination of head height and flow rate where the pump operates at its highest efficiency is the 
“best efficiency point” of the pump. The lower bound of the operating envelope is 90% of the 
head height at the best efficiency point and 90% of the flow rate at best efficiency point. The 
upper bound of the operating envelope is 110% of the head height at best efficiency point and 
130% of the flow rate at the best efficiency point. The operating envelope puts a lower bound on 
efficiency at 87% based on the pump-turbine performance curves supplied by engineers at the St. 
Anthony Falls Laboratory (Lueker, personal communication, July 2011). Flow rates are 
discretized in 5% increments within this operating envelope, allowing the operator to choose 
between 21 different levels of participation in the frequency regulation market at both pumping 
and generating modes. These choices correspond to 𝑟𝑔,1 through  𝑟𝑔,21 in Equation 4, which 
specifies the set of mutually exclusive possible actions as  




)       (4) 
where pump denotes pumping mode, g denotes generating mode at best efficiency flow rate; i 
denotes idling, and r denotes the capacity level of regulation service with subscripts p and g to 
denote the provision of regulation service in pumping and generating modes. Each level of 
67 
 
regulation service corresponds to a regulation service capacity defined as the capacity to provide 
regulation in the up and down directions. The remaining capacity is used to serve the day ahead 
and real time energy markets. 
I assume that the rotational speed of the pump can be varied ±10% of the nominal 
rotational speed. Because the pumping speed can be adjusted, the PHES facility can change the 
rate of energy use and can thus provide regulation services in pumping mode. Changing the 
rotational speed ±10% results in an approximate 60% change in power output. The ratio of actual 
power use (𝐸𝑝1,𝑡) to power use at the nominal pump speed (𝐸𝑝𝑜,𝑡) is the ratio of the rotational 
speed (𝛾1) to the nominal pump speed (𝛾0): 
𝐸𝑝1,𝑡/𝐸𝑝0,𝑡 = 𝛾1/𝛾0.         (5) 
The volumetric flow rate, Vol, depends on the choice of the control. If the PHES facility 
is in pumping mode, Vol is the best efficiency point flow rate. If the PHES facility is generating 
power without providing regulation service, Vol is the maximum flow rate. If the PHES facility is 
withholding capacity to provide regulation service, Vol is set based on amount of capacity offered 
into the regulation services market. In addition, when the operator offers capacity for regulation 
service, Vol is adjusted in response to AGC instructions from the system operator to ramp up or 
down. Power generation is computed using the following formula for approximating 
hydroelectric power (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1981): 
𝐸𝑔,𝑡 = 9800 ∙ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡 ∙ ℎ𝑡 ∙ 𝜃𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒/(3600 ∗ 10^6)    (6) 
where 𝐸𝑔,𝑡  is the electricity generated (MWh), 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡 is the volumetric flow rate (m
3/h), ℎ𝑡 is the 
initial head height (m) for each time step, and 𝜃𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒  is the turbine efficiency, which is a 
function of the head height and the flow conditions. Electricity generation is computed for each of 
the discrete 5m head heights and volume. The change in the head height in one hour depends on 
the volume of flow and the size and shape of the upper and lower reservoirs. Electricity 
consumption for pumping is computed using the following equation (U. S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, 1979):  
𝐸𝑝,𝑡 = 9800 ∙ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡 ∙ ℎ𝑡/(𝜃𝑃𝑢𝑚𝑝 ∙ 3600 ∙ 10^6) ,     (7) 
where 𝐸𝑝,𝑡 represents power use as a function of head height and flow conditions and 𝜃𝑃𝑢𝑚𝑝 is 
the pump efficiency. I set 𝑄𝐷𝐴,𝑡 = 𝐸𝑝,𝑡 when the PHES facility is in pumping mode and 𝑄𝐷𝐴,𝑡 =
𝐸𝑔,𝑡 when the PHES facility is in generation mode. 𝐸𝑔,𝑡 and 𝐸𝑝,𝑡 also put an upper bound on 
regulation capacity because they indicate the maximum capacity given the head height and 
maximum achievable flow rate.  




𝑅𝑀(𝑠𝑡, 𝑥𝑡) = {
0,                              idle
−𝑝𝐷𝐴,𝑡𝑄𝐷𝐴,𝑡 ,                 pumping
𝑝𝐷𝐴,𝑡𝑄𝐷𝐴,𝑡,                          generating
𝑝𝐷𝐴,𝑡𝑄𝐷𝐴,𝑡+𝑝𝑟,𝑡𝑄𝑟,𝑡+𝑝𝑅𝑇,𝑡𝑄𝑅𝑇,𝑡,   frequency regulation
   (8) 
 
where 𝑄𝑅𝑇,𝑡 = ∑ 𝐴𝐺𝐶𝑖
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𝑖=1  is the simulated vector of AGC instructions within an hour denoting 
the net frequency regulation provided in the up direction and 𝑄𝑟,𝑡 is the regulation service 
capacity. The ISO-NE compensation formula for frequency regulation has the three components 
described above (regulation capacity payment, the mileage payment, and regulation opportunity 
costs). These are reflected in the current period reward function for the ISO-NE rules. I set the 
economic dispatch point equal to zero based on the assumption that the marginal cost of 
producing power is zero for a PHES plant. The capacity-to-service ratio is set equal to 0.1 based 
on an historical analysis by ISO-NE which found that on average one MW of regulation 
capability produced 10 MW of regulation service (ISO-NE Market Manuals, 2013). The reward 
function with New England rules is, thus: 
 
 𝑅𝑁𝐸(𝑠𝑡, 𝑥𝑡) = {
0,                                                        idle
−𝑝𝐷𝐴,𝑡𝑄𝐷𝐴,𝑡,                                           pumping
𝑝𝐷𝐴,𝑡𝑄𝐷𝐴,𝑡,                                                  generating
𝑝𝐷𝐴,𝑡𝑄𝐷𝐴,𝑡+ 𝑝𝑟,𝑡𝑄𝑟,𝑡+0.1𝑝𝑟,𝑡 ∑|∆𝑀𝑊|+𝐿𝑀𝑃𝑡∗𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑡,    frequency regulation
.  (9) 
 
The mileage payment for frequency regulation is a major difference between the ISO-NE 
compensation (9) and the MISO compensation scheme before compliance with FERC rule 755 
(8). This mileage payment rewards the total amount of up and down ramping that occurs in each 
time period; as with regulation capacity under ISO-NE rules, this mileage payment is 
compensated with the regulation clearing price, 𝑝𝑟,𝑡. But this compensation differs from former 
MISO rules, which used the real-time price of electricity to compensate (charge) power injections 
(withdrawals).  
I treat the change in head height in a stepwise fashion within the hour, and look up the 
efficiency factor for each step. The transition function for the head height is: 
ℎ𝑡+1 = ℎ𝑡 + 8024𝑚
3 ∗ 𝑎𝑣𝑔(𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡),      (10) 
where 8024𝑚3 is the volume of water that is displaced during each step change in head height 
and is calculated from the PHES facility parameters in the BARR Engineering Giants Ridge 
project. The variable  𝑎𝑣𝑔(𝑉𝑜𝑙) is the average flow rate during the hourly period and is a 
function of the action, initial head height, and the simulated AGC instructions during the hour to 
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regulate up or regulate down if providing regulation service capacity. Prices for electricity and 
regulation service transition independently of the action taken by the operator. 
 
4.2.2.2 Application: Minnesota’s Iron Range 
I applied the models above to a potential PHES plant in Minnesota’s Iron Range. BARR 
Engineering identified a number of potential sites for PHES, one of which was Giants Ridge 
(BARR Engineering, 2009). I chose this site for its feasibility and its proximity to wind resources 
that could be used to generate electricity and are affecting the value of regional LMPs. 
Engineering specifications are taken from Barr Engineering (2009) and the parameters are listed 
in Table 1. BARR designed a preliminary PHES power plant for this site, where I assume that the 
upper and lower reservoirs are rectangular cube. The maximum and minimum head heights fix 
the total volume of water that can be displaced at 2,928,000 m3. Turbine and pump efficiencies 
(𝜃𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒 and 𝜃𝑃𝑢𝑚𝑝) depend on flow and head conditions, and a wicket gate controls the flow of 
water from the upper reservoir to the lower reservoir. At full gate, the flow of water reaches its 
maximum attainable volume. I assume that the flow of water may be reduced to 90% of 𝑄𝐵𝐸𝑃 
because this value puts a lower bound on 𝜂𝑡 at approximately 0.88. Data relating turbine 
efficiency to various head height and flow conditions was obtained from BARR (2009) and 
conversations with engineers at the St. Anthony Falls Laboratory at the University of Minnesota. 
I interpolated these points with a second-degree polynomial and used this interpolation to 
generate data that relate the turbine efficiency to all of the possible discrete flow and head height 
conditions. This PHES plant can have a capacity as high as 111 MW and store up to 770 MWh.  
 
Table 4-1: Parameters for Potential PHES Plant in Minnesota’s Iron Range 
Variable Definition Value 
LWSEmin Min Lower Water Surface Elevation 357 m 
LWSEmax Max Lower Water Surface Elevation 371 m 
UWSEmin Min Upper Water Surface Elevation 483 m 
UWSEmax Max Upper Water Surface Elevation 487 m 
AL Surface Area for the Lower Reservoir 209,108 m2 
AU Surface Area for the Lower Reservoir (𝐴𝑈) 714,027 m
2 
hmax Maximum Head Height  129.80 m 
hmin Minimum Head Height  111.60 m 
hBEP Best Efficiency Pump Head Height  120.97 m 
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QBEP Best Efficiency Pump Discharge 87.13 m3/sec 
Pmax Maximum Power Output 111 MW 
 
I used electricity prices from 2010 near the potential Giants Ridge plant and the market 
clearing prices in the day-ahead market for frequency regulation reserve. The one-week arbitrage 
period begins Sunday at midnight and is selected because price forecasts are available for one-
week periods, making the assumption of perfect foresight more realistic (Siohansi et al., 2009). 
The one-week period is also sufficient to allow for arbitrage opportunities that exist within and 
across days. LMPs in the day-ahead electricity market exhibit the typical diurnal pattern, with 
higher prices during the daytime and lower prices during the nighttime. LMPs are also typically 
lower during the weekend compared to weekdays, which suggests that inter-day arbitrage 
opportunities may exist.  
Figure 4-2: PHES Regulation Service and Allowable Regulation Service 
 
The figure above shows a simulated set of instructions (solid line) to provide regulation 
service in the up or down directions over a one-hour time period. In the simulation, the PHES 
plant offered 3.16 MW of regulation service capacity into the market. Since a PHES plant can 
ramp from shutdown to maximum capacity in less than two minutes, I assumed that the PHES 
facility could follow ACE without error. MISO and ISO-NE limit regulation capacity to the 
amount the resource can ramp in five minutes. The dotted line tracks this allowable regulation 
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deployment under the assumption that the resource needs five minutes to ramp 3.16 MW. The 
response time of PHES is on the order of a few seconds. Thus, PHES is capable of meeting its 
dispatch targets within the four-second-response time.  
Our dynamic programming model is solved using backwards recursion for 52 one-week 
periods, starting with the last week in 2010 and ending with the first week in 2010. The optimal 
values for each state at t=1 for week j+1 are used as the carryover values for week j. The 
optimization assumes perfect foresight and assigns carry-over values to stored energy in the 
terminal period. The model produces a set of optimal actions for each time period and a series of 
revenues and costs that result from these optimal actions and resulting state variables. In addition, 
the value of the PHES facility in terms of operating profit for a time interval, including the entire 
year of the analysis, can be computed. I report on these results below.  
 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Results for a One-Week Period in January 
The figure below shows the optimal dispatch schedule for a one-week period in January. 
Prices were acquired from the MISO’s historical data archive, for a pricing node close to the 
Minnesota Iron Range (Midwest ISO Market Reports, 2012). The market-clearing price (MCP) 
for frequency regulation is for the MISO sub-region in which the Minnesota Iron Range is 
located. Increasing head heights indicate that the PHES facility is in pumping mode—the upper 
reservoir is recharging and stored energy is increasing—whereas decreasing head heights indicate 
that the upper reservoir is discharging (stored energy is decreasing).  
During the winter within the MISO territory, demand peaks twice each weekday:  late 
morning and evening, before and after the typical workday. The PHES facility is put into 
pumping mode (generating mode) during the off-peak (peak) periods when demand is low (high). 
Periods with low prices are long enough to allow the upper reservoir to completely recharge. In 
addition, the amount of storage capacity (six consecutive hours of storage at maximum capacity) 
is sufficient for the operator to bid into the day-ahead energy and frequency regulation markets 
for the entire period of high prices. The negative LMPs on Tuesday indicate a highly congested 
system at the node and are a disincentive for generating power at the node.  
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Figure 4-3: Upper Reservoir Discharge and Recharge, Electricity Prices, and Frequency 
Regulation 
 
The daily operating pattern is similar but different across each day of the one-week 
period, suggesting the presence of both inter-day and intra-day arbitrage opportunities. I 
calculated the net operating revenues by summing the revenues from generating electricity and 
providing frequency regulation and subtracting payments for pumping and any net withdrawals 
during the provision of regulation service. Total operating revenue was $447,000, of which 
$54,000 came from providing regulation services. After subtracting the costs of pumping, the 
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Figure 4-4: One-Week Operating Profit and Storage Capacity under MISO Rules 
  
The figure above shows the relationship between the one-week operating profit and the 
number of hours of storage under MISO market rules. I defined “hours of storage” as the number 
of consecutive hours that the PHES facility can generate electricity at the maximum flow rate 
without recharging the upper reservoir. Hours of storage are a function of the maximum flow rate 
and the volume of water that can be displaced. The number of hours of pumping that are 
necessary to fully recharge the upper reservoir is calculated by dividing hours of storage by the 
PHES plant’s pumping efficiency. Operating profits are computed by solving the model for 
different hours of storage. Therefore, we assumed that the operator makes optimal decisions in 
each one-hour time period.  
Operating profit is the sum of the payments for providing regulation services and the 
profit from arbitraging the electricity market. I solved the model multiple times, using different 
levels of ℎ𝑚𝑖𝑛 and ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥 to denote different storage capacities. The figure above shows 
diminishing returns as hours of storage increase and that these diminishing returns impose an 
upper limit on the one-week operating profit. Approximately 90% of the operating profit is 
captured in the first six hours of storage, which suggests that most of the arbitrage value of 
storage is derived from taking advantage of the diurnal price pattern rather than inter-day price 
variation.  
I compared the optimal dispatch schedule for a PHES facility under the former MISO 
rules with one being compensated under ISO-NE rules, where the formula for providing 
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frequency regulation compensates generators with a mileage payment, based on the sum of up 
and down movements, in addition to a payment for capacity. Such a mileage payment encourages 
faster ramping resources—which provide more ACE correction and more accurate regulation 
services—to participate in the market for frequency regulation. As a consequence, the operator 
sets aside more capacity to provide frequency regulation reserve under ISO-NE rules. 
Operating profit under ISO-NE rules is $464,000—2.4 times the operating profit under 
MISO rules for the same one-week period. Operating revenue is also much greater under ISO-NE 
rules, $733,000 (ISO-NE) compared to $447,000 (MISO). This additional operating revenue 
occurs because ISO-NE rules compensate for the total amount of ACE correction. Under the ISO-
NE rules, $424,000 is attributable to regulation services, which is more than eight times the 
revenue from providing regulation services under MISO rules.  
 
4.3.2 Profitability for One-Week Periods in Winter and Summer 
I compared the operation of a PHES facility in the winter with its operation in the 
summer by using data for a one-week period in January and July, 2010. The major difference 
between the two one-week periods is the behavior of the day-ahead price series. The figure below 
shows the patterns for the electricity prices in the day-ahead markets in the two seasons. In 
contrast to the daily morning and evening peaks during the winter, the electricity prices in July 
have only one peak in the late afternoon.  
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Figure 4-5: Day-Ahead Electricity Prices 
 
Notes: This figure presents day-ahead electricity prices for one-week periods in January 2010 
(winter period) and July 2010 (summer period). 
 
The table below presents summary statistics for one-week price series in January and 
July. The maximum and minimum price levels in the day-ahead market during the one-week 
period are $90.90 and $16.79 (January) and $60.81 and $4.71 (July). Note that electricity prices 
are both higher and more variable (higher standard deviation) for the one-week period in January 
than for the one-week period in July. The double-peak pattern in diurnal electricity prices 
increases the variability in electricity prices during the winter and creates additional opportunities 
for arbitrage. 
 
Table 4-2: Summary Statistics for One-Week Time-Series of Prices 
 Electricity Markets  
Regulation Services Day-Ahead Real-Time 
 January July January July January July 
Mean  $45.00 $27.81 $43.87 $28.80 $17.75 $12.22 
Std. dev. $17.21 $12.81 $23.65 $18.76 $9.16 $5.98 




























January day-ahead prices July day-ahead prices
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Minimum  $16.79 $4.71 -$17.95 -$28.24 $5.01 $4.60 
Notes: This figure presents day-ahead electricity prices for one-week periods in January 2010 
(winter period) and July 2010 (summer period). 
 
Opportunities for arbitraging day-ahead electricity prices result from volatility in electricity 
prices, and revenues and profits should be lower in July as a result. The table below confirms this 
expectation; total operating profit under MISO market rules for the weeks in January and in July 
are $196,000 and $153,000, respectively, and operating revenues are $447,000 and $265,000, 
respectively. The same relationship with volatility exists when dispatch is optimized for the ISO-
NE market rules. For the one-week period in July, total operating profit is $302,000 and total 
operating revenue is $450,000, compared to $464,000 and $763,000, respectively, for January. 
The table below also shows 57.8 percent and 60.4 percent of total operating revenue comes from 
frequency regulation under the ISO-NE market rules for one-week periods in January and July 
respectively. In contrast, frequency regulation under MISO market rules in January and July 
accounts for only 12.1 percent and 13.2 percent of total operating revenue respectively. 
Frequency regulation as a percentage of total operating revenue is slightly higher in January and 
July under either set of compensation rules, but varies significantly according to the rules under 
which the PHES facility operates. This result is consistent with expectations since load 
fluctuations of less than a minute exhibit random characteristics and do not depend directly on the 
amount of load.  
 
Table 4-3: Profitability and Operations over One-Week 
 January July 
    MISO  ISO-NE MISO ISO-NE 
A. Total Operating Profit $196,000 $464,000 $153,000 $302,000 
B. Total Operating Revenue $447,000 $733,000 $265,000 $450,000 
C. Frequency Regulation Revenue $54,000 $424,000 $35,000 $272,000 
D. C as a percentage of B 12.1% 57.8% 13.2% 60.4% 
Notes: One-week periods were selected in January 2010 and July 2010 at same node used in the 
analysis in the above subsection. 
 
4.3.3 Profitability over the Entire Year in 2010 
The table below shows the operating profit, operating revenue, and the operating revenue 
attributable to frequency regulation over the entire year for under both MISO and ISO-NE rules 
for 2010. The table below underscores the importance of how market rules drive the value of 
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energy storage technologies like PHES; total operating profit and total operating revenue under 
ISO-NE market rules is approximately twice those under MISO market rules, and revenue from 
providing frequency regulation services are more approximately eight times more under ISO-NE 
rules than under MISO rules. 
 
Table 4-4: Profitability and Operations over the Year 2010 
 MISO ISO-NE 
A. Total Operating Profit $6,386,000 $14,916,000 
B. Total Operating Revenue $13,786,000 $24,004,000 
C. Frequency Regulation Revenue $1,227,000 $10,166,000 
C. as a percentage of B. 8.9% 42.4% 
Notes: This analysis uses the same pricing node as in the above analysis.  
 
A comparison between the two tables above indicates that there are seasonal differences 
in the profitability of energy storage technologies under the different market rules. The total profit 
under ISO-NE market rules was $0.464M and $0.302M for one week in January and in July, 
respectively (Table 4-3). It was more profitable to operate the PHES facility in January than in 
July, and more profitable in these months, on average, than during the remainder of the year. 
Calculating annual profit based on January and July profits yields $39.8M, which is substantially 
more than the actual annual profit of $14.9M (Table 4-4). Presumably, profitability peaks in the 
winter and the summer and decreases in the spring and the fall. This effect may be due to less 
demand for electricity in the temperate seasons of the year. 
 
4.3.4 Capacity-to-Service Ratio Sensitivity Analysis 
To explore the robustness of profits and how operating decisions depend on the mix of 
payments for regulation capacity and regulation services, I varied the capacity-to-service ratio 
from 0.01 to 0.4. The baseline capacity-to-service ratio used above is 0.1 which was chosen by 
ISO-NE to approximately equalize payments for regulation capacity and regulation service. Here, 
the endpoints of our sensitivity analysis achieve a 1:10 ratio of service payments to capacity 
payments (0.01 capacity-to-service ratio) and a 4:1 ratio, where payments for regulation service 
are four times payments for regulation capacity.  
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Figure 4-6: Total Operating Revenue for a One-Week Period in January 2010 
 
 




























0.01 $235,245 $478,086 $90,489 14 1 72 5 76 
0.025 $271,167 $529,466 $146,470 8 1 74 56 29 
0.05 $339,553 $611,962 $241,830 5 0 76 86 1 
0.1 $504,309 $752,048 $421,626 3 0 78 87 0 
0.2 $779,242 $1,025,526 $789,053 4 0 79 85 0 
0.3 $1,036,597 $1,353,174 $1,165,520 2 0 78 88 0 
0.4 $1,299,476 $1,603,293 $1,515,755 1 0 82 85 0 
 
Figure 4-6 above shows total one-week operating profit increases in the capacity-to-
service ratio. Total operating profit increases at an increasing rate up to a ratio of 0.2. This 
reflects changing operating strategies. For a ratio of 0.01, the PHES facility idles for fourteen 































ratio is 0.4. The PHES facility also allocates more capacity to providing regulation service at 
higher capital-to-service ratios. For a ratio of 0.01, the facility chooses to provide the maximum 
amount of frequency regulation (intensity level=1) for only 5 hours. This compares to 56 hours 
and 86 hours at a capacity-to-service ratios equal to 0.025 and 0.05 respectively. The positive 
impact on total operating revenues is an indication the PHES facility is capable of fast ramping 
and accurately following instructions to ramp up or down. The results show payments for 
regulation service are an important component of operating profit, suggesting that such payments 
are necessary for incentivizing the PHES installations. Revenues for providing frequency 
regulation account for 58% of total revenue in the baseline scenario and 95% of total revenue in 
the scenario with the ratio set equal to 0.4.  
 
4.4 Discussion 
Policies to promote renewable energy technologies and energy storage are well studied, 
but often in absence of electricity market rules. As energy storage technologies operate in markets 
and the rules of these markets can incentivize different operational decisions, profits, and the 
functioning, analysis within the context of the regional electricity system is critical. To study 
these issues, I developed a dynamic programming model to assess and evaluate the operational 
decisions of a PHES facility in competitive electricity markets. I parameterized this model with 
prices in the day-ahead markets for electricity and frequency regulation and the real-time market 
for electricity to investigate the arbitrage value of PHES, under two different sets of ISO rules: 
MISO and the ISO-NE. I used a one-week time horizon for the model to capture arbitrage 
opportunities that exist within and across days and to make the assumption of perfect foresight of 
prices realistic. 
Our results show that arbitrage opportunities exist due to the well-known diurnal price 
pattern and inter-day variations, but that ISO rules are very important as they can provide a 
significant additional source of revenue. I calculated the value of market rules: in the MISO 
region, the weekly operating profit would be $196,000 in January and 2.4 times higher 
($464,000) under ISO-NE rules. Profits under ISO-NE rules are consistently higher because the 
compensation mechanisms reward the responsiveness of PHES to instructions to ramp up or 
down. This difference presents an important, yet understudied, area for energy policy research.  
The volatility of prices over a one-week period decreases significantly during the spring 
and fall seasons in most areas of the MISO footprint. I found that arbitrage opportunities over the 
one-week period in January are greater than in July and, in calculating the annual profits under 
both sets of market rules, I found the lower price volatility in the fall and spring also contributes 
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to lower average weekly profits. 
The optimal size of a PHES facility is also a function of how the market operates. When I 
solved for the one-week operating profit as a function of storage capacity I found that 
approximately 90% of the weekly operating profit is captured in the first six hours of capacity, 
suggesting that the arbitrage opportunities within the day are more important than those across 
days. Payments for regulation capacity and the provision of regulation service are also important 
components of the operating profit. The model results show that, under both MISO and ISO-NE 
rules, an operator should set aside some capacity for providing frequency regulation. The 
incentives provided by the ISO-NE rules encourage a greater amount of capacity to be set aside. 
The advantage of the model is its simplicity and its focus on PHES profitability. 
However, the purpose of the model is only to estimate revenue to a PHES facility from the sale of 
electricity and grid reliability services into the wholesale markets. I assume the PHES facility is a 
price-taker and examine the optimal bidding strategies from the perspective of an operator of a 
single PHES facility operator. The model does not provide insight into the self-scheduling 
problem confronting price-makers (e.g., de la Torre et al., 2002) nor do I focus on optimal grid 
market operations. Also, I do not address issues facing operators of a portfolio of resources (for 
example, electric utilities). In settings with large-scale penetration of wind or solar in the resource 
portfolio and regulatory obligations to provide electricity from these resources, energy storage 
may allow the reduction of wind curtailment which could drive the optimal dispatch of PHES and 
be another important source of profit.  
One extension of this model would be to generalize the power producer’s objective 
function and add risk constraints, which could include long-term bilateral agreements for the sale 
of peak power and the purchase of off-peak power. These agreements may be necessary for an 
Independent Power Producer to hedge risk, guarantee revenue streams, and secure financing for a 
PHES plant. 
Large-scale deployment of PHES could increase off-peak prices, reduce peak prices, and 
reduce the arbitrage value of PHES making the price-taking assumption less realistic. But 
arbitraging electricity prices is one of several revenue streams; frequency regulation, for example, 
is the highest valued ancillary service. While PHES has the potential to serve numerous valuable 
market and transmission functions, only a few of these have been successfully monetized thus far. 
Private investors will likely under-invest in PHES if they are unable internalize the benefits of 
valuable market and transmission services. Consequently, the design of markets, as well as 




The integration of large-scale wind energy or other variable renewables like solar into the 
electricity system and the increased need for significant expansion of the transmission system can 
create other important opportunities for storage technologies. Future research should seek to 
better understand the role that energy storage can play in reducing the cost of large-scale wind 
integration and deferment of transmission expansion. Better understanding of these sources of 
value is important for realizing other policy goals, as efforts to justify and promote development 




Energy storage could become vital to ensuring the successful evolution of energy 
systems. PHES is an important and promising technology to bring supply and demand in to 
balance and to smooth the incorporation of electricity generated from variable resources into the 
electricity grid. But while the technologies are important, the rules governing them are critical for 
their deployment. 
Market rules vary across regional ISOs and determine the optimal size of PHES facilities, 
influence optimal operational and bidding strategies for individual PHES operators, and affect the 
profits of these facilities. An important consequence of differences in these market rules is that 
they can lead to different profits in different areas of the country. In our study, it was more 
profitable to operate a PHES facility under ISO-NE rules than it was with MISO rules. Profit-
maximizing developers may not choose to develop energy storage projects where they are most 





The objective of this dissertation is to analyze the operational strategies and economic 
viability of different power systems in the wholesale electricity markets from the perspective of 
an IPP. Additionally, the dissertation considers the ability of market participants to exercise 
market power in the wholesale electricity markets, which is the policy challenge that has received 
the most attention since the California energy crisis. 
Chapter 1 investigated the potential for exercising market power in the PJM region. The 
results presented in this paper show some evidence that market power was exercised with and 
without the incorporation of start-up costs. Evidence that market power was exercised is strongest 
during months having unseasonably cold temperatures and fuel price spikes as well as during the 
winter peak season. The results also show the degree of market power increases during the peak 
hours of the day. These results are consistent with expectations because there are more 
opportunities to exercise market power during peak hours. Transmission congestion during peak 
hours will lead to the presence of more pivotal suppliers. Additionally, output during peak hours 
is on a steeper part of the aggregate marginal cost curve (output during peak hours is higher). This 
creates opportunities for power plants that anticipate a strategic advantage to manipulate market 
prices by withholding supply to boost prices. These results are also consistent with studies of 
market power in the California electricity market showing market power is typically exercised 
when temperatures increase during the warm summer months when demand for power is the 
highest. My results show there are generally more opportunities to exercise market power in the 
PJM region during the cold winter months when demand for power is high and fuel prices have 
potential to spike upward.  
In Chapter 2, I investigated the conditions under which it would be profitable to operate a 
low temperature geothermal power plant with chilled-water cooling system. Although such as 
system was found to not be generally cost effective, there may exist market conditions and 
institutions in the future that would make such a system economical. I note that the Unted States 
is moving to a smart grid and dynamic pricing programs using real-time prices, which offers 
enhanced opportunities to utilize a chilled-water cooling to increase the value of low-temperature 
geothermal. Perhaps more importantly, Chapter 2 makes a contribution to the idea that 
geothermal does not have to be thought of as just base load generation. Opportunities exist to 
utilize the flexible geothermal generation to provide power during high demand periods and to 
provide other market and transmission services to the power system.  
In Chapter 3, I showed that market rules vary across RTOs/ISOs and determine the 
optimal size of PHES facilities, influence optimal operational and bidding strategies for 
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individual PHES operators, and affect the profits of these facilities. An important consequence of 
differences in these market rules is that they can lead to different profits in different areas of the 
country. In our study, it was more profitable to operate a PHES facility under ISO-NE rules than 
it was with MISO rules. Thus, profit-maximizing developers may not choose to develop energy 
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7.1 Appendix A - Description of the PJM Interconnection 
PJM administers the wholesale electricity market and transmission grid in all or parts of 
Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Jersey, Maryland, Michigan, North 
Carolina, West Virginia, Virginia, the District of Columbia, and Tennessee. The following figure 
is a map of the transmission zones within the PJM balancing authority. There are 21 transmission 
zones within the PJM regional footprint.  
Figure 7-1: PJM Transmission Zones 
 
Notes: This figure was retrieved from PJM’s map of transmission zones (PJM, n.d.).  
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7.2 Appendix B – Nameplate Capacity by Power Plant Type 
Table 14 shows the nameplate capacity in MW for power plant types within the PJM 
region in 2016.9 Most of the capacity in the PJM region is coal and natural gas generation. There 
is also a sizable amount of nuclear generation within the region.  
 
Table 7-1: Nameplate Capacity and Power plant Type 
Fuel Type Nameplate Capacity (MW) 
SOLAR 2,789 
COAL 81,593 








Notes: The data on nameplate capacity by fuel type are obtained from 2016 data on power plants 
located within the PJM region. 
 
  
                                                 
9 The nameplate capacity is a term that represents the output level that could be maintained over a long 
period of time. 
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7.3 Appendix C - Data Sources used to Calculate Competitive Benchmark Price 
The EPA eGRID 2016 was used to source data on power plants within the PJM region. I 
obtained data on the power plant fuel type, heat rate (the amount of energy required to generate 
one MWh of electricity), and capacity (in MW) for every power plant in the PJM region. Data on 
start-up costs was obtained from NREL in a study conducted by Kumar, Besuner, Lefton, Agan, 
and Hilleman (2012). Data on fuel prices were obtained from the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA). For coal, natural gas, and oil prices, I used a monthly dataset on the cost of 
coal, natural gas, and distillate fuel receipts at electric generating plants (dollars per million Btu, 
including taxes). Information on variable operations and maintenance costs was also sourced 
from the U.S. EIA.  
Hourly data on total metered generation, system energy prices, price taking generation, 
regulation reserve capacity and net imports were obtained from PJM’s public database. Monthly 
Equivalent Demand Forced Outage rates by generation type and nameplate capacity were also 
sourced from PJM’s public database.  
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7.4 Appendix D - PJM Day-Ahead System-Wide Energy Prices 
The following tables show the average day-ahead system energy prices by hour of the 
day and for dates by month and year. 
 
Table 7-2: Day-ahead System Energy Price $/MW by Hour of the Day 

























Notes: These data were retrieved from https://www.pjm.com/markets-and-
operations/etools/data-miner-2 with the PJM Data Miner. These are average hourly electricity 




Table 7-3: Day-ahead System-wide Market Price $/MW by Month 
 System-wide market price 
Month Year 2016 Year 2017 Year 2018 
Jan 29.6 30.9 70.9 
Feb 26.8 26.2 26.7 
Mar 24 31.5 31.5 
Apr 27.7 29 33.9 
May 23.3 29.5 33.1 
Jun 25.6 26.9 29.8 
Jul 32.2 29.9 32.6 
Aug 31.8 26.9 32.2 
Sep 29 29.2 32.1 
Oct 28.2 28.5 34 
Nov 25.7 29 36.6 
Dec 31.9 35.5 33 




7.5 Appendix E - Metered Loads 
The following table shows the average daily metered load (in MW) for dates by month 
and year. 
 
Table 7-4: Day-ahead System-wide Market Price $/MW by Month for the Year 2018 
 Average Daily Metered load in MW 
Month Year 2016 Year 2017 Year 2018 
Jan 95,003 94,179 105,717 
Feb 90,889 88,279 94,179 
Mar 78,873 89,028 90,182 
Apr 77,207 79,902 81,734 
May 79,476 81,918 87,514 
Jun 96,083 96,672 98,560 
Jul 108,517 106,731 107,654 
Aug 110,989 99,700 109,559 
Sep 95,519 91,127 97,843 
Oct 80,808 82,933 87,051 
Nov 82,811 87,143 90,736 
Dec 96,314 99,751 96,716 




7.6 Appendix F – Deviations from Competitive Benchmark without Start-up Costs 
 











Month Year 2016 Year 2017 Year 2018 
Jan 20.4% 17.7% 99.1% 
Feb 13.1% 8.5% 2.8% 
Mar 2.6% 25.9% 28.1% 
Apr 18.7% 22.3% 39.6% 
May 0.7% 18.8% 36.1% 
Jun 5.9% 4.8% 14.4% 
Jul 12.2% 11.8% 16.1% 
Aug 16.8% 6.4% 17.8% 
Sep 14.0% 18.1% 26.9% 
Oct 17.7% 20.5% 39.9% 
Nov 8.5% 20.3% 45.9% 





Table 7-6: Average deviation from Competitive Benchmark by Hour of Day 






































7.7 Appendix G – PHES Model Solution  
Model Solution: 
To obtain the MW h from generation, the procedure is as follows:  
 LOOKUP the initial head height 
 LOOKUP efficiency factor corresponding to the INITIAL HEAD HEIGHT and 
maximum flow rate 
 CALCULATE the time it takes to reach NEXT HEAD HEIGHT 
 CALCULATE generation (in MW h) for INITIAL STEP 
 Proceed through the head heights in discrete space in a stepwise fashion 
 Repeat process above for each step until the end of the hourly period 
 Sum generation (in MW h) at step to get the total MW h produced for the hourly period 
 
A similar procedure is used to find the MWh required to store energy. 
 Part-flow efficiency considerations put an upper bound on the amount regulation capacity 
that can be offered into the market. The partial flow is defined as 𝑉𝑜𝑙/𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑚𝑎𝑥 where 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑚𝑎𝑥  is the maximum flow rate. I set a lower bound for the partial flow at 
𝑉𝑜𝑙/𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 0.75 and discretize the partial flow rates. The discrete space contains 21 
different points corresponding to the 21 different regulation capacities that can be 
offered. The action space contains 24 different actions – the 21 different regulation 
capacities, pumping, generating, and idling.  
 The head height h is a controlled Markov process so that ℎ𝑡+1 depends on ℎ𝑡 and the 
action 𝑥𝑡. In the model, the prices for electricity and frequency capacity transition 
independently of the action 𝑥𝑡 taken by the operator. The equation of motion for h is a 
function of the flow rate, which depends in turn on the action taken in time period t. The 
discrete time state transition lookup table is a 366 × 366 array where the number of rows 
and columns correspond to the number of points in the discrete head height space. I 
constructed a state transition lookup table for each action. The state transition array is a 
matrix of 0s and 1s. The 1s indicate the next state given the current state and the action 
taken in current time.  
 Backward recursion is used to solve the optimization problem. The terminal point is free, 
so I use a backward recursive process to solve beginning at the terminal point plus one 
additional time period. The following algorithm is used to solve the model recursively 
backward.  
o START process in time period T 
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o EVALUATE the current plus expected future rewards for each point in the 
Cartesian product H ×  X where H is set the points in the discrete head height 
space and X is the set of actions 
o SET 𝑽𝑻+𝟏 = 𝟎 where 𝑽𝑻+𝟏 is a 366 × 1 vector of expected future values of 
reaching the next state in time period 𝑇 + 1 
o RETRIEVE a point in the set 𝑌 = H ×  X  
o COMPUTE the current reward 
o LOOKUP the next state in the state transition array 
o LOOKUP the expected future value of reaching the next state in time period 𝑇 +
1 from 𝑽𝑻+𝟏 
o SUM the current and expected future rewards 
o REPEAT this process for all the points in the set Y 
o FIND the action that maximizes then sum of current and expected future rewards 
for each point in the discrete space of head heights– this is the optimal action for 
time period T given the current head height 
o SET each element of 𝑉𝑇 equal to the maximized sum of the current and expected 
future rewards for the corresponding head height 
o REPEAT the process for time periods 𝑇 − 1 … 1 
 
The following algorithm describes the simulation process used to compute operating revenues 
and profits: 
 Set the initial state in time period 1 
 LOOKUP the current reward for each action 
 LOOKUP the state transitions for each action 
 LOOKUP the expected future reward of reaching the next state in time period 2 
 SUM the current and expected future rewards for each action 
 Select the maximum sum – this corresponds to the optimal action given the initial state in 
time period 1 
 LOOKUP the state transition corresponding to the optimal action – this gives the state in 
time period 2 
 Repeat the process for time periods 𝑡 = 1 … 𝑇 
 Output a vector of states and a vector of optimal actions for each time period periods 𝑡 =
1 … 𝑇 
 
